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 #PERSONALJURISDICTION: A NEW AGE OF  
INTERNET CONTACTS 
ZOE NIESEL* 
No other issue has proved more challenging in the sphere of personal jurisdiction 
than the internet. In addition to refusing to respect territorial boundaries, the internet 
allows users to access, change, create, and manage content in ways that are not 
present in physical space. Further, the rise of social media and other more 
interactive technologies, such as bots and cookies, make determining a user’s 
minimum contacts with a forum more challenging than ever. The time has come to 
acknowledge that the internet has minimum contacts with every jurisdiction.  
Current approaches used when personal jurisdiction and the internet collide are 
straining under technological developments. The premiere approach to internet 
jurisdiction is the so-called “Zippo test,” which bases personal jurisdiction on 
whether a website is “interactive.” The Zippo approach has left the case law 
inconsistent and does not account for recent innovations, such as social media, 
targeted advertising, artificial intelligence, and bots. This Article proposes a shift in 
the manner in which courts should think about personal jurisdiction and website 
interactivity. Specifically, this Article proposes that the time has come to embrace a 
revised analysis that incorporates traditional fairness factors with the defendant’s 
implicit acknowledgement that the internet is targeting a national forum.  
The analytical framework proposed by this Article seeks to remove inconsistent 
applications of an outdated Zippo test. However, it also attempts to be proactive. 
The internet is moving to become even more customized, ubiquitous, and self-aware 
than ever before. A new way to examine internet contacts is thus needed to account 
for changing technologies to ensure fairness and predictability.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Modern notions of personal jurisdiction in the United States are largely based on 
the question of contacts.1 Such focus is the product of nearly sixty years of Supreme 
Court doctrine that has seen a transition of personal jurisdiction from a theory based 
around territorial power to one that is focused on the due process rights of the 
defendant.2 This underlying purpose attempts to ensure that the critical question is 
one of fundamental fairness. 
“Enter the Internet,”3 a global network of computers that has come to influence 
all aspects of American life. The internet has challenged traditional notions of 
personal jurisdiction since its inception, with early cases struggling in how to apply 
the concept of minimum contacts with the forum through an online medium.4 
Difficulties in applying personal jurisdiction are manifest—the internet does not 
respect territorial boundaries, is accessible anytime and anyplace, and allows users 
from all parts of the globe to access and contribute.5 These aspects do not fall neatly 
into the traditional jurisprudence on personal jurisdiction, although courts have 
attempted to classify internet technology such that simple lines can be drawn around 
internet contacts.6 However, these frameworks are largely based on technology from 
the 1990s and do not account for the rise of new web platforms and applications such 
as social media, targeted advertising, artificial intelligence, and bots, among other 
things.  
 This Article explores the complicated relationship between minimum contacts 
and the modern internet. Part I traces the development of modern personal 
jurisdiction analyses in the areas of both specific and general jurisdiction. Interesting 
in this historical overview is the increased reliance on predictability, even as courts 
have recognized that advanced technologies and infrastructure have made the 
maintenance of lawsuits infinitely easier than in the days before International Shoe.7 
Part II then explores the intersection between personal jurisdiction and the internet 
as well as the rise of the so-called Zippo “interactivity” test for jurisdiction in cases 
involving websites. Although Zippo has represented the cornerstone of internet-
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Clarifying General Jurisdiction, 34 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 807, 812–13 (2004).  A contacts-based analysis arose from the Supreme Court’s decision 
in International Shoe, which articulated specific and general jurisdiction as separate bases for 
in personam jurisdiction. Id.   
 2. See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxities de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982) 
(“The personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects an individual liberty interest. 
It represents a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of 
individual liberty.”). 
 3. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1123 (W.D. Pa. 1997); 
see also Panavision Int’l., Ltd. P’ship. v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616, 618–19 (C.D. Cal. 1996) 
(providing a discussion of domain name disputes and personal jurisdiction issues upon the 
advent of the internet). 
 4. See infra Part II. 
 5. Dig. Equip. Corp. v. Altavista Tech., 960 F. Supp. 456, 462 (D. Mass. 1997) (“[N]ot 
only is there perhaps ‘no there there,’ the ‘there’ is everywhere where there is Internet access.”) 
(emphasis in original).   
 6. See, e.g., Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124. 
 7. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
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based jurisdiction since its publication in 1997, there are several problems with the 
test, including incorrect applications in the area of general jurisdiction and 
inconsistent applications when websites contain advertisements, contact information, 
or other possible interactive features. 
 Part III examines the changing nature of the modern internet and the move from 
Web 1.0 to Web 2.0.8 This change has brought with it increased interactivity in online 
experiences, including the rise of social media. These changes have made it difficult 
to continue to apply the Zippo analysis as it currently exists. Accordingly, Part IV of 
this Article proposes a shift in the manner in which courts should think about 
personal jurisdiction and website interactivity. Specifically, this Article proposes that 
courts should move away from interactivity-based analyses to a more holistic 
analysis that examines the defendant’s expectations based on the increased global 
presence of the internet and traditional notions of fairness. 
The analytical framework proposed by this Article seeks to do two things. First, 
the framework eliminates inconsistent applications of the Zippo test. An examination 
of the case law reveals that websites with many of the same features are now being 
classified differently in various jurisdictions. Second, the framework attempts to lay 
a sustainable groundwork that can withstand future technological innovations.  It is 
without question that the internet has changed substantially since the time of Zippo 
in 1997. However, the future holds even greater changes for the way in which users 
communicate online and receive information. Addressing these changes now will lay 
a sustainable groundwork for the near future, when the web will become more 
semantic, more personal, and even more ubiquitous. 
I. THE QUESTION OF MINIMUM CONTACTS 
Personal jurisdiction allows a court to exercise power over the person of the 
defendant and thus allows the court to enter a binding judgment against that 
defendant.9 American conceptions of personal jurisdiction were traditionally based 
on the idea of territorial power and the sovereignty of state borders.10 The importance 
of territorial power can be seen in one of the earliest and most recognizable personal 
jurisdiction cases, Pennoyer v. Neff.11 In Pennoyer, the court examined contours of 
state sovereignty to determine that jurisdiction could be exercised in one of three 
scenarios: (1) if service of process was completed in the state, (2) if an individual 
had his or her domicile within the state, or (3) if the defendant consented to 
jurisdiction in the state.12  
                                                                                                                 
 
 8. For definitions of these terms, see infra Section III.A. 
 9. Amanda Reid, Operationalizing the Law of Jurisdiction: Where in the World Can I 
Be Sued for Operating a World Wide Web Page?, 8 COMM. L. & POL’Y 227, 228 (2003). 
 10. See generally Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: 
The ‘Power’ Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956) (summarizing the 
traditional understanding of personal jurisdiction); Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court, the 
Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts: From Pennoyer to 
Denckla: A Review, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569, 569–74 (1958).  
 11. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
 12. Id. at 733–36. 
106 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 94:103 
 
The simplicity of the Pennoyer approach, and its devotion to concepts of 
territorial power, was ill-suited to developments in national commerce, such as the 
increased transmission of business across state lines and the rise of modern corporate 
forms. Modern corporations challenged the idea that physical presence should 
control personal jurisdiction; after all, corporations operate across state lines, despite 
being incorporated elsewhere.13  
An early precursor to the modern minimum contacts analysis—and Band-Aid on 
the problems created by Pennoyer—involved courts assessing whether an entity was 
“doing business” in the state.14 The “doing business” analysis was an attempt to 
bootstrap in-state activities into the equivalent of a physical presence that was limited 
to the state. Cases identified a multitude of factors, such as the presence of offices, 
employees, or even transactions in the jurisdiction, to determine if a corporation was 
in fact doing business in the state.15 Eventually modern business practices and 
interstate communication led to the need to move away from Pennoyer and the 
“doing business” model.16 
The move away from Pennoyer was accomplished in International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington,17 which first provided an analysis concerned with the conduct and 
contacts of the defendant in the forum state. In looking to traditional notions of due 
process and considerations of fairness to the defendant, the International Shoe Court 
proposed a method of determining personal jurisdiction which would examine: (1) 
whether the individual or corporate defendant had sufficient contacts with the forum 
and (2) whether an exercise of jurisdiction would offend “traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice.”18 The court distinguished between instances in which 
the defendant’s contacts gave rise to the claim and instances in which the defendant 
had such meaningful contacts with the state that it would be just to force the 
defendant to appear and defend a claim that arose anywhere.19 
The minimum contacts inquiry created in International Shoe encompasses two 
separate jurisdictional theories—the theory of dispute-blind, or general, jurisdiction 
and the theory of dispute-specific, or specific, jurisdiction.20 Specific jurisdiction 
looks to determine whether there are minimum contacts with the forum state and that 
the claim at issue arises from those contacts. Additionally, the application of specific 
                                                                                                                 
 
 13. See generally William F. Cahill, Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations and 
Individuals Who Carry on Business Within the Territory, 30 HARV. L. REV. 676 (1917); 
Kurland, supra note 10, at 577–88. 
 14. See, e.g., Vencedora Oceanica Navigacion, S.A. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne 
de Navigation, 730 F.2d 195, 201 (5th Cir. 1984). 
 15. See, e.g., Peoples Tobacco Co. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79 (1918); Phila. & 
Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917); Int’l Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 
579 (1914); St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218 (1912); Green v. Chi. Burlington 
& Quincy Ry. Co., 205 U.S. 530 (1907).  
 16. See Kurland, supra note 10, at 577–86. 
 17. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
 18. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).  
 19. Id. at 317. 
 20. Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A 
Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966).   
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jurisdiction must be reasonable and fair such that the application of due process is 
not violated by the forum’s exercise of power over the defendant.21  
In contrast, general jurisdiction examines whether the defendant’s contacts in the 
forum are so significant that the defendant should be subject to jurisdiction in the 
forum regardless of where the claim arose.22 If general jurisdiction is satisfied, a court 
may exercise power over a defendant as to any lawsuit, even if its underlying 
activities were wholly outside the forum.23 
A. Minimum Contacts and General Jurisdiction  
Historically, the question of what constituted general jurisdiction was tied to the 
question of whether “continuous corporate operations within a state were thought so 
substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit . . . on causes of action arising from 
dealings entirely distinct from those activities.”24 This concept was illustrated in 
Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.,25 in which the president and principal 
stockholder of a Philippine mining company ceased operations of the corporation 
during World War II and returned to his home in Ohio.26 In Ohio, the president 
opened an office and two bank accounts for the mining company, paid salaries and 
other expenses, and held directors’ meetings.27  
Plaintiff sued the company in Ohio for dividends and damages based on the 
company’s failure to issue certificates for shares of stock that she claimed to own.28 
The Supreme Court found general jurisdiction because of the president’s “continuous 
and systematic supervision of the necessarily limited wartime activities of the 
company.”29 This “continuous and systematic” language became the cornerstone of 
a general jurisdiction analysis for over sixty years.30  
The “continuous and systematic” language appeared again in Helicopteros 
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall.31 Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia 
(“Helicol”), a Colombian company, was sued in Texas state court by representatives 
                                                                                                                 
 
 21. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. 
 22. Id. at 317–18. 
 23. See id.; see also Bell Paper Box, Inc. v. U.S. Kids, Inc., 22 F.3d 816, 819 (8th Cir. 
1994) (engaging in a distinction between the parameters of specific jurisdiction and the 
parameters of general jurisdiction). 
 24. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318. 
 25. 342 U.S. 437 (1952). 
 26. Id. at 447. 
 27. Id. at 448. 
 28. Id. at 438–39.  
 29. Id. at 446, 448.  
 30. Gorman v. Ameritrade Holding Corp., 293 F.3d 506, 510 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (stating the 
standard as “general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation is . . . permissible if the defendant’s 
business contacts with the forum district are ‘continuous and systematic’”); Grand Entm’t 
Grp., Ltd. v. Star Media Sales, Inc., 988 F.2d 476, 481 n.3 (3d Cir. 1993) (“General jurisdiction 
exists where the defendant ‘has maintained “continuous and substantial” forum affiliations.’”); 
Zoe Niesel, Daimler and the Jurisdictional Triskelion, 82 TENN. L. REV. 833, 848 (2015); 
Danielle Tarin & Christopher Macchiaroli, Refining the Due-Process Contours of General 
Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations, 11 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 49, 61 (2012).  
 31. 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984). 
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of four American citizens killed after a Helicol helicopter crashed in Peru.32 To 
justify the existence of general jurisdiction in the forum, the plaintiffs pointed to 
Helicol’s contacts in the forum which included helicopter purchases, employee 
trainings, and $5 million in payments drawn on a Texas bank.33 The Court 
determined that these activities were not “the kind of continuous and systematic 
general business contacts” that could justify an exercise of dispute-blind 
jurisdiction.34  
The end points of analysis fixed by Perkins and Helicopteros proved less than 
useful as lower courts divided on the exact quality and quantity of contacts that could 
support an exercise of general jurisdiction.35 Further, the “continuous and systematic 
contacts” language that supported general jurisdiction was the subject of 
considerable criticism from scholars and the international community as it led to 
disparate results and significant uncertainty for businesses attempting to determine 
whether they may be subject to the exercise of general jurisdiction in any particular 
forum.36 
Against this background, the Court issued a series of cases that further clarified 
the role and application of general jurisdiction and provided what might have been 
considered a more easily applied test.37 In Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. 
v. Brown,38 the Court examined a case that arose when two American teenagers were 
killed in a bus accident in France after competing in an international soccer 
tournament.39 The parents of the victims sued for damages in North Carolina, 
alleging that a defect in the bus’s tires was the cause of the accident. Defendants in 
the suit were Goodyear Dunlop Tires France SA and Goodyear Luxembourg Tires 
SA (together, “Goodyear foreign subsidiaries”),40 both of which claimed that a North 
Carolina court could not exercise personal jurisdiction over them as they had no 
offices, operations, or ongoing business in North Carolina.41 As part of the larger 
Goodyear distribution network, tires manufactured by the Goodyear foreign 
subsidiaries had in fact reached North Carolina, but the Court found that participation 
in this type of distribution scheme did not create general jurisdiction based on 
“continuous and systematic contacts.”42 Instead, the Court made an additional 
qualification to the “continuous and systematic contacts” standard by holding that 
                                                                                                                 
 
 32. Id. at 410, 412.  
 33. Id. at 410–11.  
 34. Id. at 416 (emphasis added). 
 35. Mary Twitchell, Why We Keep Doing Business with Doing-Business Jurisdiction, 
2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 171, 184–85 (2001). 
 36. See Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A 
Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966).   
 37. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, 
S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011). 
 38. 564 U.S. 915 (2011). 
 39. Id. at 918. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 920, 922. 
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A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or 
foreign-country) corporations to hear any and all claims against them 
when their affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ 
as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.43 
In 2014, the Court further clarified the “at home” language through the adoption 
of a more bright-line test for general jurisdiction in Daimler AG v. Bauman.44 The 
Daimler plaintiffs were former employees and relatives of former employees of 
Mercedes-Benz Argentina, a wholly-owned subsidiary of DaimlerChrysler 
Aktiengesellschaft (“Daimler”), a German company. Plaintiffs claimed that from 
1976 to 1983 Mercedes-Benz Argentina collaborated with Argentina’s state police 
to kidnap, torture, and kill workers as part of Argentina’s “Dirty War.”45 Plaintiffs 
filed their suit against Daimler in California, attempting to hold Daimler liable for 
the actions of its Argentinian subsidiary.46 Plaintiffs based general jurisdiction in 
California on the presence of Mercedes-Benz USA, another Daimler subsidiary, in 
California.47 Mercedes-Benz USA had multiple contacts with California—it had a 
regional office, vehicle preparation center, and classic car center, and California 
accounted for 2.4% of Daimler’s total worldwide sales.48  
In examining the jurisdictional question raised in Daimler, the Court noted that 
the “continuous and systematic” language was not enough to support a finding of 
general jurisdiction and that contacts must be such that the defendant could be said 
to be “at home” in the forum state.49 In defining the “at home” standard, the Court 
noted the paradigmatic bases for general jurisdiction would be the state of 
incorporation and principal place of business.50 Because Daimler’s principal place of 
business and place of incorporation were located outside of California, neither 
paradigmatic base was present on the facts of the case.51 
The Daimler opinion did not foreclose the possibility of some type of continuous 
contacts-style analysis for general jurisdiction.52 Indeed, the Court specifically noted 
that in an “exceptional case,” à la Perkins, contacts could be “so substantial and of 
such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that State.”53 Thus, while 
Daimler establishes that a corporation is certainly at home where it is incorporated 
or its principal place of business is located, some exceptional level of contacts may 
still justify an exercise of general jurisdiction in a particular forum.54 
                                                                                                                 
 
 43. Id. at 919 (emphasis added).  
 44. 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).   
 45. Id. at 748.  
 46. Id. at 751. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 752. 
 49. Id. at 751. 
 50. Id. at 760.  
 51. Id. at 761. 
 52. See id.  
 53. Id. at 761 n.19. 
 54. Id.  
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B. Minimum Contacts and Specific Jurisdiction  
Cases involving internet contacts are largely based on the question of whether 
specific jurisdiction is satisfied.55 Specific jurisdiction involves the questions of 
whether the defendant’s contacts with the forum gave rise to the claim at hand and 
whether certain reasonableness factors are satisfied.56 The preeminent case on the 
matter is still International Shoe, which first established that courts would have 
specific jurisdiction when the defendant has minimum contacts with the forum state, 
and application of jurisdiction would not offend “traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.”57 
The question of what, exactly, satisfies the standard of “minimum contacts” 
remains unclear. In International Shoe, the question was easily answered—the 
defendant, a Delaware corporation with a principal place of business in Missouri, 
solicited orders from customers in Washington State through door-to-door salesman 
and permanent display rooms located in the state.58 Further, the defendant was 
generating a significant volume of sales of its product in the state.59 The Court noted 
that while the “casual presence” of a corporate agent in the state and “isolated items 
of activities” would not subject a corporate defendant to specific jurisdiction in a 
forum, other acts, based on the “nature and quality and the circumstances of their 
commission,” could render a defendant subject to suit in the forum if those actions 
gave rise to the liability sued on.60 Important was the concept that the defendant had 
taken some act that purposefully availed “itself of the privilege of conducting 
activities within the forum” and had thus invoked the benefits and protections of the 
forum’s laws.61 
While International Shoe proved easily managed, significant questions about the 
application of specific jurisdiction arose as the economy continued to emphasize 
interstate commerce. Indeed, the pre-International Shoe era had seen individuals and 
businesses that conducted activities almost entirely intrastate; in contrast, the post-
International Shoe era saw both individuals and corporations that did significant 
activity across state lines, including selling and purchasing goods and services, 
advertising, maintaining additional physical infrastructure, and maintaining 
employees in multiple jurisdictions. These increases in interstate business and 
communication required a more expansive notion of personal jurisdiction and a 
clarification of the meaning of minimum contacts. 
Additional Supreme Court cases have attempted to clarify the exact boundaries of 
the minimum contacts standard. In McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.,62 the 
Court in 1957 recognized that developments in communication and transportation 
                                                                                                                 
 
 55. See Ackourey v. Sonellas Custom Tailors, 573 F. App'x 208, 211 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 56. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). 
 57. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 
457, 463 (1940) (noting that traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice are implicit 
in constitutional due process)).   
 58. Id. at 314–15. 
 59. Id.   
 60. Id. at 317–18.   
 61. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). 
 62. 355 U.S. 220 (1957). 
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technology made it much easier for a defendant to be sued in a forum where it was 
engaging in some type of economic activity.63 These modern developments 
apparently were such that the Court felt comfortable finding specific jurisdiction 
when the corporate defendant, an insurance company, had one single contact in the 
California forum.64 Specifically, the defendant had delivered a single insurance 
contract to a California resident and had received premiums from the insured, sent 
from California, until the insured’s death.65 
The Court again took up the question of minimum contacts in 1980, when it 
decided World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson.66 Woodson presents a more 
interesting question, as the defendant’s contacts with the forum were more tangential. 
Specifically, the defendant, a vehicle retailer, had sold an Audi automobile to the 
Robinson family in Massena, New York.67 The next year, the Robinson family 
initiated a cross-country move to Arizona, and, while passing through Oklahoma, 
sustained severe injuries when another vehicle struck their Audi in the rear.68 The 
Robinsons brought a products liability action in Creek County, Oklahoma, claiming 
that their injuries were the result of defective placement of the Audi’s fuel system 
and gas tank.69 
In analyzing the question of personal jurisdiction over the New York vehicle 
retailer, the Court emphasized the dual nature of specific jurisdiction: first, to ensure 
that defendants are not required to litigate in inconvenient forums, and second, that 
states do not reach beyond limits established by “their status as coequal sovereigns 
in a federal system.”70 In assessing the question of minimum contacts, the Court was 
wholly unimpressed with any contacts the vehicle retailer had in Oklahoma, noting: 
Petitioners carry on no activity whatsoever in Oklahoma. They close no 
sales and perform no services there. They avail themselves of none of the 
privileges and benefits of Oklahoma law. They solicit no business there 
either through salespersons or through advertising reasonably calculated 
to reach the State. Nor does the record show that they regularly sell cars 
at wholesale or retail to Oklahoma customers or residents or that they 
indirectly, through others, serve or seek to serve the Oklahoma market. 
In short, respondents seek to base jurisdiction on one, isolated occurrence 
and whatever inferences can be drawn therefrom[.]71 
                                                                                                                 
 
 63. Id. at 222–23. The predictions in McGee seem particularly relevant today. McGee 
noted that “many commercial transactions touch two or more States and may involve parties 
separated by the full continent. With this increasing nationalization of commerce has come a 
great increase in the amount of business conducted by mail across state lines.” Id. With the 
advent of the internet and smart phone, commercial transactions have only continued to touch 
multiple fora.   
 64. Id.   
 65. Id.   
 66. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
 67. Id. at 288. 
 68. Id.   
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 292.   
 71. Id. at 295.   
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The Court rejected the notion that a physical object could serve as the agent for 
service of process in a jurisdiction and that amenability to suit would travel wherever 
a chattel was taken by its purchaser.72 As such, defendants should only be subject to 
jurisdiction where they “should reasonably anticipate being hauled into court.”73 
Critical to the Court was the ability of a corporation to structure its conduct so that it 
could have some minimum assurance as to whether personal jurisdiction might 
arise.74 
The Court further addressed the question of contacts directed towards a forum 
state in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz.75 In Burger King, the defendants opened a 
restaurant franchise in Drayton Plains, Michigan, with the franchise contract stating 
that the laws of Florida, the location of Burger King Corporation headquarters, would 
govern.76 The defendants’ franchise suffered poor sales, and Burger King attempted 
to close the Michigan location after the defendants failed to make monthly payments 
to the headquarters.77 Burger King brought an action against the defendants in the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, alleging that the 
defendants had breached their franchise obligations and were tortiously infringing 
trademarks and serve marks through their continued operation of a Burger King 
restaurant.78 Defendants alleged a lack of personal jurisdiction by the Florida court, 
arguing that they were Michigan residents and that their dispute with Burger King 
Corporation did not arise out of defendants’ contacts with Florida.79 
In deciding Burger King, the Court continued to note that a forum can legitimately 
exercise specific jurisdiction over a defendant who “purposefully directs” activities 
at forum residents.80 The reasoning was two-fold. First, the Court noted that a state 
generally has “manifest interest” in redressing injuries that are inflicted on state 
citizens by out-of-state actors.81 Additionally, drawing on shades of International 
Shoe, the Court again noted that, when a defendant has voluntarily received the 
benefit and protection of the forum’s laws, it is only fair for that defendant to be 
subject to personal jurisdiction in the state.82 To determine if the defendants could 
have reasonably anticipated being hauled into court in the forum, the Court examined 
whether there was some act by which the defendant “purposefully avails itself of the 
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits 
and protections of its laws.”83 The inquiry was, therefore, whether the defendants 
                                                                                                                 
 
 72. Id. at 295–96. 
 73. Id. at 297. 
 74. Id.  
 75. 471 U.S. 462, 465–66 (1985). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 468. 
 78. Id. at 468–69. 
 79. Id. at 469. 
 80. Id. at 473 (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984)). 
 81. Id. (quoting McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222–23 (1957)). 
 82. Id. at 474 (“[T]he Due Process Clause may not readily be wielded as a territorial shield 
to avoid interstate obligations that have been voluntarily assumed.”). 
 83. Id. at 475 (“This ‘purposeful availment’ requirement ensures that a defendant will not 
be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’ contacts 
. . . or of the ‘unilateral activity of another party or a third person . . . .’” (citations omitted)). 
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deliberately engaged in significant activities or voluntarily created continuing 
obligations between themselves and the residents of the forum state.84  
The interesting aspect of Burger King is that the defendants had almost no 
physical contact with the Florida forum, besides attending one brief training class in 
Miami on the part of one of the defendants.85 The Court noted that “territorial 
presence” was often a contributing factor in the discussion of personal jurisdiction, 
especially because it reinforced notions of reasonable foreseeability, but that modern 
commercial life often obviated the need for physical presence because of increased 
commercial activity conducted across state lines by wire and mail.86 Thus, the critical 
factor was purposeful direction of commercial activity, not physical presence.87 
Burger King also reinforced “notions of fair play and substantial justice”88 by 
applying the reasonableness factors first articulated in Woodson. In addition to 
minimum contacts, courts should also consider “the burden on the defendant,” “the 
forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute,” “the plaintiff’s interest in 
obtaining convenient and effective relief,” “the interstate judicial system’s interest in 
obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies,” and the “shared interest of 
the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.”89 Such 
factors serve as a “double check” to either establish reasonable jurisdiction upon a 
lesser showing of contacts or to defeat jurisdiction when a defendant purposefully 
directs his activities at the forum state but can present other factors that would make 
the application of jurisdiction unreasonable.90  
On the facts of Burger King itself, the Court determined that the defendants had 
indeed derived substantial benefits from their franchise agreement with Burger King 
Corporation in Florida and that the language of the franchise agreement produced a 
long-term series of exacting regulations directed from the Florida headquarters.91 
This type of relationship justified finding specific jurisdiction over the defendant 
based on their continuing and wide-reaching contacts with Burger King 
Corporation.92 
While Burger King addresses the question of “purposeful availment” or 
“purposeful direction” based on the defendant’s activities that are directed towards 
the forum state, the jurisdictional theory articulated in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. 
Superior Court of California93 applies when the defendant’s products reach the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 84. Id. at 475–76.   
 85. Id. at 479 & n.22. 
 86. Id. at 476. 
 87. Id.; see also Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U. S. 770, 774–77 (1984); Hanson 
v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250–51 (1958); McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222–23 
(1957). 
 88. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 476–77 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 
310, 320 (1945)). 
 89. Id. at 477 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 
(1980)). 
 90. See id. 
 91. Id. at 479–80. 
 92. Id.  
 93. 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
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forum state in what has been called the “stream of commerce.”94 The theory of stream 
of commerce assesses personal jurisdiction by questioning whether the target 
corporation delivered “its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation 
that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State.”95  
The facts of Asahi are straightforward. Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. (“Asahi”), 
a Japanese corporation, manufactured tire valve assemblies and then sold those 
assemblies to Cheng Shin Rubber Industrial Co., Ltd. (“Cheng Shin”), a Taiwanese 
corporation that used Asahi’s valve assemblies in tire tubes that were eventually sold 
in the United States.96 The plaintiff filed a products liability action against Cheng 
Shin in California after his Honda motorcycle collided with a tractor, claiming that 
components of the tire, including the tire tube, were defective.97 Cheng Shin filed a 
cross-claim for indemnification against Asahi, which had manufactured the tube 
valve assembly present in the plaintiff’s tire.98 Asahi contested personal jurisdiction 
on the grounds that there were not sufficient contacts on its part in the California 
forum.99  
In deciding Asahi, a plurality of the justices relied on Burger King and the notion 
that the “‘substantial connection’ between the defendant and the forum State 
necessary for a finding of minimum contacts must come about by an action of the 
defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State.”100 The plurality opinion, 
authored by Justice O’Connor, found “[t]he placement of a product into the stream 
of commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully directed 
toward the forum State.”101 Justice O’Connor identified a number of ways in which 
a defendant could engage in “more” conduct that would lead to purposeful 
availment—the defendant could design the product for market in the forum, advertise 
in the forum, have a mechanism for advising customers in the forum, or mark the 
product through a distributor serving as a sales agent in the forum.102 Because no 
such additional actions were identified on the facts of the case, an exercise of 
personal jurisdiction by California would be inappropriate.103  
In contrast, Justice Brennan authored an opinion suggesting that placing a 
product into the stream of commerce with awareness that the final product is being 
marketed in the forum state is sufficient for purposeful availment.104 Justice 
Brennan reasoned that 
[t]he stream of commerce refers not to unpredictable currents or eddies, 
but to the regular and anticipated flow of products from manufacture to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 94. Id. at 112. 
 95. Id. at 109 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 
297−98 (1980)) (emphasis added). 
 96. Id. at 106. 
 97. Id. at 105−06. 
 98. Id. at 106. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 112 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 
 101. Id.   
 102. Id.  
 103. See id. 
 104. See id. at 116 (Brennan, J., concurring).   
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distribution to retail sale. As long as a participant in this process is aware 
that the final product is being marketed in the forum State, the possibility 
of a lawsuit there cannot come as a surprise. Nor will the litigation 
present a burden for which there is no corresponding benefit. A 
defendant who has placed goods in the stream of commerce benefits 
economically from the retail sale of the final product in the forum State, 
and indirectly benefits from the State’s laws that regulate and facilitate 
commercial activity.105 
The split in Asahi created ambiguity for the circuit courts, which were left to guess 
which opinion to adopt. Ultimately, a significant number chose to follow the 
approach adopted by Justice O’Connor, but others ignored Asahi in favor of earlier 
precedent such as Woodson and Burger King.106 
The development of the minimum contacts analysis from International Shoe to 
Asahi shows some attempt at guidance in the area of specific personal jurisdiction, 
although perhaps unsuccessfully.107 Such cases have traditionally emphasized 
growth in transportation and communication logistics as driving forces in the 
flexibility of a minimum contacts analysis. However, such “advances” in these cases 
focus on wire and mail, not the type of global electronic communication that is 
possible due to the internet.  
II. MINIMUM CONTACTS AND INTERNET JURISDICTION 
At the heart of jurisprudence on the topic of minimum contacts is the concern 
about the defendant’s ability to structure its contacts as to reasonably anticipate suit 
in the forum. This concern is brought into focus when assessing tests for personal 
jurisdiction involving internet contacts. Particularly troubling here is the lack of 
guidance from the Supreme Court itself. In the absence of such guidance, several 
approaches have developed in the lower courts to account for the increased 
significance of internet activities, but the most prominent of these tests is the so-
called “Zippo test.”108 
                                                                                                                 
 
 105. Id. at 117. 
 106. Compare Holland Am. Line Inc. v. Wärtsilä N. Am., Inc., 485 F.3d 450, 459 (9th Cir. 
2007), with Seiferth v. Helicopteros Atuneros, Inc., 472 F.3d 266, 273 (5th Cir. 2006). 
 107. See, e.g., Kevin C. McMunigal, Desert, Utility, and Minimum Contacts: Toward a 
Mixed Theory of Personal Jurisdiction, 108 YALE L.J. 189, 189 (1998) (citing cases criticizing 
the minimum contacts test and noting that “[a]mbiguity and incoherence have plagued the 
minimum contacts test for the more than five decades during which it has served as a 
cornerstone of the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction doctrine.”).   
 108. The most prominent of the lower court tests is Zippo.  However, the Zippo test built 
on a history of other lower court opinions that had taken up the question of personal 
jurisdiction and internet contacts. For example, in Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 
1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996), the defendant’s website served as a promotional tool to advertise its 
new internet service and encouraged users to add their addresses to a mailing list to receive 
updates. Id. at 1330. The court based an exercise of personal jurisdiction on the website’s 
“active solicitations” and “promotional activities.” Id. at 1332–33 (“Although CyberGold 
characterizes its activity as merely maintaining a ‘passive website,’ its intent is to reach all 
internet users, regardless of geographic location.”). A more aggressive pre-Zippo exercise of 
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A. The Rise of the Zippo Test  
The Zippo test, a product of a 1997 decision by the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania, has remained the most prominent of the 
lower court approaches to internet-based minimum contracts.109 Zippo involved a 
California corporation, Dot Com, that operated an internet news website and had 
obtained the exclusive right to use the domain names “Zippo.com,”110 “Zippo.net,” 
and “Zipponews.com.”111 The plaintiff, the Pennsylvania manufacturer of Zippo 
brand lighters, sued for a number of claims, including trademark dilution and 
infringement.112 
The minimum contacts question in Zippo revolved heavily around the question of 
how, exactly, the California-based Dot Com was or was not contacting the 
Pennsylvania forum.113 Dot Com’s internet news website contained advertisements 
and an application for its news service, which provided three levels of 
membership.114 Each level of service provided additional access to a greater number 
of internet newsgroups.115 An online subscriber filled out an application present on 
Dot Com’s website and then made payment over the internet or telephone.116 The 
application was processed and the subscriber received a password that enabled her 
to view or download newsgroup messages that were stored on a California server.117 
Dot Com’s contacts with Pennsylvania appeared to be the same type of garden-
variety contacts that any website might have with a forum. All of Dot Com’s 
infrastructure was in California, including its offices, employees, and internet 
servers.118 Any contact with Pennsylvania was entirely online; specifically, Dot 
Com’s information was available to Pennsylvania via its website, and two percent of 
                                                                                                                 
 
personal jurisdiction occurred in Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 
(D. Conn. 1996). In that case, the defendant’s contacts with the forum involved posting a 
website that was available to approximately 10,000 forum residents. The court based 
jurisdiction on the fact that on the internet, “unlike television and radio advertising, the 
advertisement is available continuously to any Internet user.” Id. at 165. 
 Unlike Inset, Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), more 
thoroughly examined the question of interactivity in making a personal jurisdiction 
determination. The website at issue in Bensusan contained general information about the 
defendant’s business and a calendar of events. Id. at 297. A user could not purchase anything 
from the website and had to call or travel to the business’s location to transact any business. 
Id. The court found that the website’s passive nature did not create purposeful availment 
necessary for minimum contacts. See id. at 300−01.    
 109. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997). 
 110. The current holder of the “Zippo.com” domain name appears to be the manufacturer 
of Zippo Lighters.   
 111. Id. at 1121.   
 112. Id.    
 113. See id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id.   
 118. Id.   
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its subscribers were Pennsylvania residents who had filled out Dot Com’s online 
application to receive its news subscription.119 
In deciding the question of minimum contacts, the Zippo court turned its attention 
to the principle articulated in Burger King—that jurisdiction could not be avoided 
because “the defendant did not physically enter the forum state.”120 The court found 
that different results should not be achieved when a corporation reached beyond its 
boundaries to conduct business, even if that contact occurred through the internet.121 
The test adopted by the Zippo court is deceptively simple. In establishing a 
“sliding scale” test, the court attempted to tie the nature and quality of commercial 
activity to the likelihood of personal jurisdiction existing in the forum.122 The court 
noted that such a test was consistent with “well developed personal jurisdiction 
principles,” referring perhaps to the principle of foreseeability for the corporate 
defendant.123  
The Zippo sliding scale test contains three touchpoints of analysis. First, there are 
situations where the defendant is said to clearly be doing business over the internet.124 
Such examples include where the defendant is entering into contracts with residents of 
a foreign jurisdiction that involve intentional and repeated transmission of files over 
the internet.125 The “middle ground” is occupied by situations where an internet user 
can exchange information with the host.126 In these interactive website scenarios, 
jurisdiction is determined by examining “the level of interactivity and commercial 
nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the Web site.”127 Finally, the 
easiest cases are those in which there is a passive website involved.128 These passive 
websites involve situations where the web host has done little more than make 
information available to the user, and thus personal jurisdiction does not exist.129  
In examining the facts of the underlying case, the Zippo court determined that 
personal jurisdiction over Dot Com was proper in Pennsylvania based on the 
exchange of information occurring over the internet.130 Specifically, the court 
pointed to the fact that Dot Com was accepting applications from Pennsylvania 
residents over the internet and was then assigning and sending those residents 
passwords that were used to download and access Dot Com’s news service.131 This 
activity was deemed to be an interactive type of experience, and thus led to the 
conclusion that personal jurisdiction in the Pennsylvania forum was appropriate.132  
                                                                                                                 
 
 119. Id.   
 120. Id. at 1123 (emphasis in original) (quoting Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 
476 (1985)).   
 121. Id. at 1124. 
 122. Id.  
 123. Id.  
 124. Id.  
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id.  
 128. See id. 
 129. Id.  
 130. Id. at 1126. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id.  
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The impact of Zippo on jurisdictional jurisprudence is significant. The Third 
Circuit, Fifth Circuit, and Ninth Circuit have recognized the Zippo case as a “seminal 
authority regarding personal jurisdiction based upon the operation of an internet web 
site.”133 The Fourth Circuit, Sixth Circuit, and Eighth Circuit have chosen to adopt 
the Zippo test as a factor to define “purposeful availment” in the minimum contacts 
analysis.134 Further, even circuits that have not expressly adopted Zippo still use its 
interactivity analysis to determine minimum contacts.135 
In sum, the Zippo test has been largely adopted in some form or mode by the 
circuit courts in assessing internet-related personal jurisdiction.136 The reason is 
                                                                                                                 
 
 133. Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 452 (3d Cir. 2003); see also Mink 
v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 1999) (“The Zippo decision categorized 
Internet use into a spectrum of three areas. At one end of the spectrum, there are situations 
where a defendant clearly does business over the Internet by entering into contracts with 
residents of other states which ‘involve the knowing and repeated transmission of computer 
files over the Internet . . . .’ In this situation, personal jurisdiction is proper.”); Cybersell, Inc. 
v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 419 (9th Cir. 1997) (“In sum, the common thread, well stated 
by the district court in Zippo, is that ‘the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be 
constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial 
activity that an entity conducts over the Internet.’”). 
 134. See Lakin v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 348 F.3d 704, 711 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that the 
“determination of whether it is ‘interactive,’ ‘does business,’ or is merely ‘passive’ is an 
important factor in our analysis. However, we have long held that the ‘nature and quality’ of 
contacts is only one factor to consider.”); ALS Scan, Inc. v. Dig. Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 
F.3d 707, 714 (4th Cir. 2002) (“[A]dopting and adapting the Zippo model, we conclude that a 
State may, consistent with due process, exercise judicial power over a person outside of the 
State when that person (1) directs electronic activity into the State, (2) with the manifested 
intent of engaging in business or other interactions within the State, and (3) that activity 
creates, in a person within the State, a potential cause of action cognizable in the State’s 
courts.”); Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 883, 890 (6th Cir. 2002) (“The 
level of contact with a state that occurs simply from the fact of a website’s availability on the 
Internet is therefore an ‘attenuated’ contact that falls short of purposeful availment.”). 
 135. These circuits do not expressly adopt Zippo but do use some form of a sliding scale 
approach that assesses the distinction between active, passive, and interactive 
websites. See McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107, 124 (1st Cir. 2005) (“[T]he mere existence 
of a website that is visible in a forum and that gives information about a company and its 
products is not enough, by itself, to subject a defendant to personal jurisdiction in that forum. 
. . . Something more is necessary, such as interactive features which allow the successful online 
ordering of the defendant’s products.”); Jennings v. AC Hydraulic A/S, 383 F.3d 546, 549–50 
(7th Cir. 2004) (“Premising personal jurisdiction on the maintenance of a website, without 
requiring some level of ‘interactivity’ between the defendant and consumers in the forum state, 
would create almost universal personal jurisdiction because of the virtually unlimited 
accessibility of websites across the country”). In 1999, in Soma Medical International v. 
Standard Chartered Bank, 196 F.3d 1292, 1296 (10th Cir. 1999), the Tenth Circuit used the 
distinction between active, passive and interactive websites to assess general jurisdiction in a 
case involving. In 2011, the Tenth Circuit suggested that Zippo was more of a “heuristic 
adjunct to, rather than a substitute for, traditional jurisdictional analysis.” Shrader v. 
Biddinger, 633 F.3d 1235, 1242 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 136. See Toys “R” Us, 318 F.3d at 452 (“The opinion in Zippo . . . has become a seminal 
authority regarding personal jurisdiction based upon the operation of an Internet web site.”); 
ALS Scan, 293 F.3d at 713; Soma, 196 F.3d at 1297; Mink, 190 F.3d at 336; Cybersell, 130 
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simple—the Zippo test presents a simplified test that seems, on its face, to make the 
question of internet jurisdiction simple for litigants and courts alike.137 One simply 
needs to classify the interactivity of the website, which should then lead to a simple 
conclusion on whether minimum contacts are satisfied. 
B. Problems with Zippo 
In application, the Zippo test has proven less “bright-line” than might be 
anticipated.138 A number of problems have arisen under the Zippo test, including 
confusion about the doctrine’s scope, problems with application, and a failure to 
change with the technological landscape. First, some courts misinterpreted the Zippo 
test’s scope by finding that the test applies in the realm of general jurisdiction, not 
specific jurisdiction.139 Pre-Daimler and the adoption of the “at home” test for 
general jurisdiction, courts largely followed Zippo to find the existence of 
“continuous and systematic” contacts. 
For example, in Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc.,140 the Ninth Circuit examined 
a case in which Gator.com Corp. (“Gator”) sought a declaratory judgment stating 
that its software, which created pop-up windows when customers visited L.L. Bean’s 
website, did not violate any L.L. Bean trademark or constitute unfair trade or sales 
practice. Gator’s software analyzed a user’s Uniform Resource Locator (“URL”) to 
recognize that a user was visiting the L.L. Bean website, and would then display a 
pop-up window offering a coupon for a competitor.141 L.L. Bean sent Gator a cease 
and desist letter requesting that Gator stop the use of these pop-ups on the L.L. Bean 
website, and Gator in turn filed an action in the District Court for the Northern 
District of California.142 L.L. Bean contested personal jurisdiction.143  
L.L. Bean’s contacts with California were typical of a company engaging in e-
commerce. L.L. Bean did not have agents in California and did not pay California 
taxes, although it did approximately six percent of its total sales in California through 
                                                                                                                 
 
F.3d at 418; see generally Reid, supra note 9, at 240 (noting common use of Zippo but that 
courts citing Zippo seem to generally reject personal jurisdiction).   
 137. See Dennis T. Yokoyama, You Can’t Always Use the Zippo Code: The Fallacy of a 
Uniform Theory of Internet Personal Jurisdiction, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 1147, 1149 (2005). 
(noting that Zippo’s popularity is part of a “zealous and understandable quest to adopt a single 
standard for all Internet jurisdiction issues” and that courts have “improvidently chosen to 
apply a unitary test based on Zippo to all Internet jurisdiction issues”). 
 138. Reid, supra note 9, at 261; Richard A. Bales & Suzanne Van Wert, Internet Website 
Jurisdiction, 20 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 21, 22−23 (2001). 
 139. The circuits have been split on whether Zippo applies to general jurisdiction. Some 
courts, although pre-Daimler, have applied Zippo to general jurisdiction cases. See Gator.com 
Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying Zippo in the context 
of general jurisdiction); Gorman v. Ameritrade Holding Corp., 293 F.3d 506, 513 (D.C. Cir. 
2002) (utilizing the Zippo test for general jurisdiction); Soma, 196 F.3d at 1296−97 (same).  
Other courts have been more critical. See, e.g., Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 471 (5th Cir. 
2002) (the Zippo sliding scale “is not well adapted to the general jurisdiction inquiry”). 
 140. 341 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003), reh’g en banc, 398 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 141. Id. at 1075. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id.  
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its catalog, phone ordering system, and website.144 Further, L.L. Bean engaged in 
email solicitation to California residents, maintained online accounts for California 
residents, interacted with California residents through online customer service 
representatives, and mailed catalogs and packages to California residents.145 
The Ninth Circuit found that these facts were sufficient to confer general 
jurisdiction under a continuous and systematic contacts analysis.146 Using the sliding-
scale test articulated in Zippo and adopted by the Ninth Circuit, the court found that 
an online store can be the “functional equivalent” of a brick-and-mortar operation, 
and that L.L. Bean’s website was highly interactive and very extensive, with millions 
of dollars in sales driven by targeted efforts to capture the California market.147 The 
high volume of sales, combined with the interactive nature of the website, were 
sufficient to find the type of continuous and substantial contacts in the forum that 
would establish general jurisdiction.148 
In the era of “continuous and systematic” contacts, other circuits also found the 
existence of general jurisdiction based on internet presence. In Gorman v. 
Ameritrade Holding Corp., the District of Columbia Circuit found general 
jurisdiction when the defendant operated a website that allowed users to open an 
account and use that account to buy and sell securities.149 The D.C. Circuit later, 
however, found that mere accessibility of a website did not meet the continuous and 
systematic contacts standard for general jurisdiction.150 Similarly, in Soma Medical 
International v. Standard Chartered Bank,151 the Tenth Circuit applied the Zippo test 
to find a lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant in Utah when the website at 
issue was a passive website that simply made information available to the user, thus 
failing the “continuous and systematic” contacts analysis.152 
                                                                                                                 
 
 144. Id. at 1074. 
 145. Id.   
 146. See id. at 1079−80. 
 147. Id. at 1079. 
 148. Id. at 1079−80. 
 149. Gorman v. Ameritrade Holding Corp., 293 F.3d 506, 512–13 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing 
Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997)). 
 150. FC Inv. Grp. LC v. IFX Mkts., Ltd., 529 F.3d 1087, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (stating 
mere accessibility of a website does not meet the minimum contacts for general jurisdiction). 
 151. 196 F.3d 1292 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 152. Id. at 1296. Other courts rejected the Zippo test in the context of general jurisdiction.  
See Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 471 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that the Zippo sliding scale “is 
not well adapted to the general jurisdiction inquiry”); Bell v. Imperial Palace Hotel/Casino, 
Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1091 (E.D. Mo. 2001) (noting that while the “sliding scale 
suggested by the court in Zippo may be a relevant factor in assessing general jurisdiction, it is 
not alone determinative”).  
 The problems with Zippo in the context of general jurisdiction are precisely the problems 
that arise from a broad application of general jurisdiction using continuous and systematic 
contacts.  In the age of continuous and systematic contacts, the use of broad jurisdictional 
power and inconsistent outcomes under this theory was widely criticized.  See Patrick J. 
Borchers, The Problem with General Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 119, 137 (2001); 
Glenn George, In Search of General Jurisdiction, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1097, 1129 (1990); Charles 
W. Rhodes, Clarifying General Jurisdiction, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 807, 811 (2004); Mary 
Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 676 (1988). Under 
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Even with the more straightforward “at home” standard for general jurisdiction, 
courts have continued to struggle with the application of the Zippo test and internet 
contacts. Some lower courts have appeared to correctly apply the at home standard 
and limited general jurisdiction in internet cases to fora where the defendant is 
incorporated or has its principal place of business. In Higgins v. Kentucky Sports 
Radio LLC,153 the District Court for the District of Nebraska determined that, in a 
case involving internet contacts, general jurisdiction would not be appropriate as 
none of the defendants had their principal place of business or state of incorporation 
in Nebraska.154 Additionally, maintaining a radio show that was downloadable by 
Nebraska residents did not meet the type of Perkins-level exception for constant and 
pervasive contacts identified in Daimler.155 
In contrast, the District Court for the Northern District of Iowa in BVS, Inc. v. 
RHUB Communications, Inc.156 applied Zippo in the context of the “at home” test 
and found that general jurisdiction was not satisfied when the defendant maintained 
a passive website that required customers to contact the defendant at its offices in 
California directly in order to purchase products or services. Even in a post-Daimler 
world, it appears courts are continuing to analyze continuous and systematic contacts 
for general jurisdiction using the Zippo test.  
In addition, the Zippo test has proved confusing even in the specific jurisdiction 
context and has led to inconsistent applications in terms of an interactivity 
analysis.157 Even in what should be an area of relatively simple application, the so-
called “passive website,” courts have divided over what features make a website 
                                                                                                                 
 
Zippo, continuous and systematic contracts would mean that the operation of a website in the 
forum could lead to overbroad application of general jurisdiction, or underinclusive 
application, because “repeated contacts with the forum residents by a foreign defendant may 
not constitute the requisite substantial, continuous and systematic contacts required for a 
finding of general jurisdiction.” Rexam Airspray, Inc. v. Arminak, 471 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1301 
(S.D. Fla. 2007) (quoting Baker v. Carnival Corp., No. 06-21527-CIV-HUCK, 2006 WL 
3360418, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 20, 2006)). Compare Case v. Cullum & Maxey Camping Ctr. 
Inc., No. 8:15-CV-588-T-24TBM, 2015 WL 4936314, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 18, 2015) 
(considering whether interactive website provided substantial, continuous, and systematic 
contacts), with TruePosition, Inc. v. LM Ericsson Tel. Co., 844 F. Supp. 2d 571, 592 (E.D. Pa. 
2012) (“To hold that the possibility of ordering products from a website establishes general 
jurisdiction would effectively hold that any corporation with such a website is subject to 
general jurisdiction in every state.”), Wilson v. RIU Hotels & Resorts, No. 10–7144, 2011 WL 
3241386, at *8 (E.D. Pa. July 29, 2011) (“Maintenance of a website which allows users to 
reserve accommodations at Defendant’s resorts does not demonstrate that [defendant] has 
systematic and continuous contact with Pennsylvania.”), and Millennium Enter. v. Millennium 
Music, 33 F. Supp. 2d 907, 910 (D. Or. 1999) (holding that to “hold that the mere existence 
of an internet website establishes general jurisdiction would render any individual or entity 
that created such a web site subject to personal jurisdiction in every state”).   
 153. No. 8:17CV367, 2018 WL 318460, at *4 (D. Neb. Jan. 5, 2018). 
 154. Id.   
 155. Id.   
 156. No. C16-0065-LTS, 2017 WL 487029, at *5 (N.D. Iowa Feb. 6, 2017). 
 157. See, e.g., Thomas A. Dickerson, Cheryl E. Chambers & Jeffrey A. Cohen, Personal 
Jurisdiction and the Marketing of Goods and Services on the Internet, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
31, 40 (2012). 
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passive. Some courts found that the simple ability to gather information from a 
website was insufficient to confer specific jurisdiction. In GTE New Media Services, 
Inc. v. BellSouth Corp.,158 the D.C. Circuit examined a case in which District of 
Columbia residents were able to access the Yellow Pages online in order to find 
contact information for individuals.159 The court determined that this was a “passive” 
website under the Zippo test, as the activity was the same as accessing a physical 
phonebook and that the consumer was not paying to use the search tool.160 Other 
courts have noted that a lack of commercial activity was the touchtone of the 
analysis; as such, websites that required a consumer to take additional steps, such as 
mailing in an order form, to complete a purchase would be on the passive end of the 
Zippo spectrum.161 
The BellSouth Corp. court’s reasoning for denying jurisdiction for an 
informational website was based on a fear that “mere accessibility” of a defendant’s 
website could be the basis for necessary “minimum contacts” with the forum.162 
According to the court, this theory of personal jurisdiction in internet-related cases 
could lead to the exercise of personal jurisdiction over any website operator 
anywhere in the country.163 In such a scenario, there would no longer be the necessary 
“degree of predictability to the legal system that allows potential defendants to 
structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that 
conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.”164 However, other courts 
considering passive websites were less concerned about the problem identified in 
BellSouth Corp. Some courts found that placing internet advertisements that were 
available in the forum was sufficient to lead to an exercise of specific jurisdiction.165 
                                                                                                                 
 
 158. 199 F.3d 1343 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 159. Id. at 1350.  
 160. Id.; see also Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 796 (8th Cir. 2010) (no personal 
jurisdiction based on internet message board because it “merely makes information available 
to other people”); In re Ski Train Fire in Kaprun, Austria on November 11, 2000, 343 F. Supp. 
2d 208 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (website allowing a user to search a database did not create minimum 
contacts with the forum).   
 161. Compare ESAB Grp., Inc. v. Centricut, LLC, 34 F. Supp. 2d 323, 327, 333–34 
(D.S.C. 1999) (website providing information about products but requiring a consumer to call 
a toll-free telephone number before placing an order was insufficient to confer jurisdiction) 
and Rosenberg v. PK Graphics, No. 03 Civ. 6655(NRB), 2004 WL 1057621 (S.D.N.Y. May 
10, 2004), with A Corp. v. All Am. Plumbing, Inc., 812 F.3d 54, 61 (1st Cir. 2016) (finding 
no purposeful availment when there was no method for ordering goods and serves through the 
website and only passive advertising of defendant’s contact information), Smith v. Basin Park 
Hotel, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1235 (N.D. Okla. 2001) (no personal jurisdiction when there 
was no evidence of any commercial activity on the website in question), and Am. Network, 
Inc. v. Access Am./Connect Atlanta, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 494, 499–501 (S.D.N.Y. 
1997) (personal jurisdiction in the forum when website allowed consumer to enter into a 
contract with the business). 
 162. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d at 1350 (“We do not believe that the advent of advanced 
technology, say, as with the Internet, should vitiate long-held and inviolate principles of 
federal court jurisdiction”).  
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).   
 165. See, e.g., Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 164 (D. Conn. 
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These courts reasoned that although the purpose of these advertisements was 
informational, and thus might be considered passive, the ease of accessibility still 
involved targeting the forum state.166  
In the realm of interactive or active websites, there was additional confusion. The 
infusion of a “doing business” or “transactional” aspect into the Zippo test created 
several divergent positions. It seems clear that most courts considered an exchange 
of money over the internet, or even the solicitation of money over the internet, to 
confer personal jurisdiction in the forum.167 These courts largely found personal 
jurisdiction even when sales in the forum state are low.168 For example, some district 
courts looked to whether consumers in the forum could make a purchase through the 
defendant’s website, even if consumers had not, or only infrequently, done so.169 
Thus, it is unclear whether the mere opportunity to purchase is sufficient.170  
                                                                                                                 
 
1996) (finding internet advertisements available in the forum was of sufficient repetitive 
nature of satisfy Connecticut long arm statute as such advertisements can be accessed over 
and over again). But see Sweetgreen, Inc. v. Sweet Leaf, Inc., 882 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 
2012) (determining that passive websites and Facebook/Twitter accounts are more like a broad 
national advertising campaign than a website engaging in e-commerce); Yokoyama, supra 
note 137, at 1161–62 (“Website advertising should not be confused with what is being 
advertised, and the mere fact that the advertising may be viewed in a particular forum should 
not suffice to establish purposeful availment.”).   
 166. See, e.g., Bochan v. La Fontaine, 68 F. Supp. 2d 692, 701 (E.D. Va. 1999). But see A 
Corp. v. All Am. Plumbing, Inc., 812 F.3d 54, 61 (1st Cir. 2016) (uttering passive sharing of 
business’ information and lack of purchasing option meant no purposeful availment); Lifestyle 
Lift Holding, Inc. v. Prendiville, 768 F. Supp. 2d 929, 935–36 (E.D. Mich. 2011) (emphasizing 
low interactivity when defendant advertised business online); Drake v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., No. 
09-C-6114, 2010 WL 1910337, at *5–6 (N.D. Ill. May 6, 2010) (website that rerouted a 
consumer to a subsidiary to complete purchases did not create purposeful availment).  
 167. See Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Found., 958 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D.D.C. 1996) (observing 
“defendant’s home page explicitly solicits contributions”); see also Smarter Every Day, LLC 
v. Nunez, No. 2:15-CV-01358-RDP, 2017 WL 1247500, at *3–4 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 5, 2017) 
(noting “[m]any courts have found that a defendant purposefully availed itself in a forum 
through Internet-based contacts . . . where the defendant’s website functioned “as the 
defendant’s storefront in the forum”; holding a website that did not allow a consumer to place 
orders or conduct business with the defendant did not create minimum contacts with the 
forum) (internal quotations omitted); Zing Bros., LLC v. Bevstar, LLC, No. 2:11–cv–00337 
DN, 2011 WL 4901321, *3 (D. Utah Oct. 14, 2011); Wound Care Educ. Inst. v. Thomas, No. 
7 C 6505, 2008 WL 2446686, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 17, 2008). 
 168. See Young Again Products, Inc. v. Acord, 307 F. Supp. 2d 713, 717–18 (D. Md. 2004) 
(testifying 0.02% of sales from Maryland online users still sufficient for personal jurisdiction).   
 169. See, e.g., Key Components, Inc. v. Braille, LLC, No. 3:09-CV-322, 2010 WL 
2506670, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. June 16, 2010). 
 170. Zing Bros., LLC v. Bevstar, LLC, No. 2:11-CV-00337 DN, 2011 WL 4901321, at *3 
(D. Utah Oct. 14, 2011) (finding personal jurisdiction when “[t]he Website allows a user to 
view product descriptions, add items to an online cart, checkout online by providing credit 
card and shipping information, and create a login and password”); Food Sciences Corp. v. 
Nagler, No. 9-1798 (JBS), 2010 WL 1186203, at *3–4 (D.N.J. Mar. 22, 2010) (low sales in 
forum still created personal jurisdiction). But see QSR Automations, Inc. v. KRS Corp., No. 
3:09CV-242-S, 2010 WL 1416700, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 31, 2010); Millennium Enters., Inc. 
v. Millennium Music LP, 33 F. Supp. 2d 907, 921 (D. Or. 1999) (stating no personal 
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More muddle occurs where the website does not allow a consumer to make 
purchases but is still considered an interactive website. For example, in VP 
Intellectual Properties, LLC v. IMTEC Corp.,171 the website at issue did not have the 
capacity for a consumer to order products online.172 It did, however, provide product 
information and allow users to send emails to customer support and fill out a form to 
order a catalogue.173 The court determined that this was not a sufficient level of 
interactivity to justify an exercise of personal jurisdiction.174 In contrast, the website 
in Multi–Tech Systems, Inc. v. Vocaltec Communications, Inc. contained product 
information and allowed consumers to contact technical support, but did constitute 
minimum contacts with the forum.175  
Courts consistently split over whether the ability to contact the business or its 
representatives through the website is sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction.176 
For example, a number of cases have found that the ability to contact company 
representatives through a website suggests the existence of personal jurisdiction. In 
Zamora Radio, LLC v. Last.fm LTD, the defendant’s website favored an exercise of 
personal jurisdiction when it had a feedback form, allowed users to sign up for a 
newsletter, and could create music channels.177 Even though the website did not 
require users to pay for services, minimum contacts were created through the site’s 
other interactive features.178 In contrast, in NeoMedia Technologies, Inc. v. AirClic, 
Inc., the website advertised products and allowed users to submit contact information 
to the business.179 The court reasoned that the lack of “online commercial 
interactions” did not rise to the level of minimum contacts.180 The District of 
Columbia Circuit noted in 1998 that a website that provided contact to the defendant 
through a direct email link was “the epitome of web site interactivity.”181 
                                                                                                                 
 
jurisdiction even though website user purchased compact discs, joined a discount club, and 
requested franchising information). 
 171. No. CIV A 99-3136, 1999 WL 1125204, at *1 (D.N.J. Dec. 9, 1999). 
 172. Id. at *4.   
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at *6. 
 175. 122 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1050–51 n.6 (D. Minn. 2000); see also Blumenthal v. Drudge, 
992 F. Supp. 44, 56 (D.D.C. 1998) (website that provided email contact and allowed an 
exchange of information between the browser’s computer and the defendant’s host computer 
was an interactive website).   
 176. In Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., the court determined a website soliciting users to 
sign up for its service created minimum contacts when the website transmitted advertising 
information, allowed users to contact the business, and sign up for services (but not pay).  947 
F. Supp. 1328, 1333 (E.D. Mo. 1996). 
 177. Zamora Radio, LLC v. Last.fm Ltd., No. 09-20940-CIV, 2011 WL 2580401, at *5 
(S.D. Fla. June 28, 2011). 
 178. Id.; see also Roblor Mktg. Grp. Inc., v. GPS Indus., Inc., 645 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1148–
1152 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (emphasizing downloadable content and newsletter meant website 
interactivity was low).   
 179. No. 04 C 566, 2004 WL 848181, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 16, 2004). 
 180. Id. (“In itself, AirClic’s website . . . does not allow for online commercial transactions 
but provides for the exchange of information . . . .”).   
 181. Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 56 (D.D.C. 1998). 
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The basic problem with the Zippo test is that its facial ease of application does not 
comport with how the technology it is attempting to classify actually operates. Courts 
are left to parcel out the “interactivity” of the website without understanding the 
background, application, and technological impact of those features. This is 
particularly problematic considering the growth of the internet in daily life, the 
increase in interactive features, and the creation of background processes that force 
interactivity into every web-based exchange.  
C. Returning to a Traditional Approach to Minimum Contacts 
In the mess of post-Zippo cases,182 some courts rejected the Zippo test and 
returned to traditional notions of personal jurisdiction.183 In Best Van Lines, Inc. v. 
Walker, the Second Circuit noted that the Zippo sliding scale “does not amount to a 
separate framework for analyzing internet-based jurisdiction” and that “traditional 
statutory and constitutional principles remain the touchstone of the inquiry.”184 In 
Walker, the defendant operated the website MovingScam.com from his home in 
Iowa.185 The purpose of the website was to provide consumers comments about 
various moving services. In a section entitled “Editor’s Comments,” the defendant 
made specific comments about the plaintiff’s moving service, which the defendant 
claimed did not carry cargo insurance and lacked legal authority to operate as an 
interstate moving service.186 The plaintiff sued for defamation in New York, and the 
defendant claimed a lack of personal jurisdiction in the forum.187  
The Second Circuit noted that it was willing to consider the Zippo test a useful 
framing tool for jurisdictional questions, but it did not replace traditional personal 
jurisdiction analyses. Thus, although the court was willing to use the Zippo test, and 
indeed did do so in assessing whether the website was interactive in accepting 
donations for its operations, it did not see this use as a replacement for traditional 
notions of due process.188 
Other courts have fallen into similar reasoning. In uBID, Inc. v. GoDaddy Group, 
Inc., the Seventh Circuit rejected the notion that the interactivity of a website is 
dispositive of the sufficiency of contacts.189 The Seventh Circuit preferred instead to 
look to a more traditional analysis of the “nature, quality, and quantity of the contacts, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 182. E.g., Triple Up Ltd. v. Youku Tudou Inc., 235 F. Supp. 3d 15, 23 (D.D.C. 
2017) (“[T]he relationship between a defendant’s online activity and its amenability to suit in 
a foreign jurisdiction often remains ill-defined.”) (internal quotation omitted).  
 183. See C. Douglas Floyd & Shima Baradaran–Robison, Toward a Unified Test of 
Personal Jurisdiction in an Era of Widely Diffused Wrongs: The Relevance of Purpose and 
Effects, 81 IND. L.J. 601, 657–58 (2006) (arguing that “a unique test of personal jurisdiction 
should not be adopted for cases involving wrongs committed by means of the Internet”). 
 184. 490 F.3d 239, 252 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 185. Id. at 241. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id.  
 188. Id. at 251–52.   
 189. 623 F.3d 421, 431 n.3 (7th Cir. 2010) (“When a plaintiff alleges that some of the 
defendant's contacts occurred through a website, the interactivity of that website is relevant to, 
but not dispositive of, the sufficiency of those contacts.”). 
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as well as their relation to the forum state.”190 Scholars have also articulated a 
preference for a return to more traditional notions of minimum contacts and due 
process. Professor Spencer argues that the level of interactivity is not of paramount 
significance in the jurisdictional question and that courts should return to a more 
traditional analysis.191 The critical components of that traditional analysis should 
focus on whether the defendant “(1) purposefully directs activity into the state via 
virtual networks; (2) that activity gives rise to, in a person within the State, a potential 
cause of action cognizable in the State’s courts; and (3) the assertion of jurisdiction 
is constitutionally reasonable.”192 The proposed advantages of this approach include 
divorcing the outcome from certain technological constructs and providing increased 
flexibility and fairness.193 
III. MINIMUM CONTACTS AND THE CHANGING INTERNET  
The Zippo test is ultimately problematic because it is the product of an internet 
that no longer exists.194 The language in Zippo shows just how dated the concepts 
that guided that decision have become. Specifically, Zippo identified the internet as 
a “global super-network of over 15,000 computer networks used by over 30 million 
individuals, corporations, organizations, and educational institutions worldwide.”195 
Further, Zippo noted that: 
In recent years, businesses have begun to use the Internet to provide 
information and products to consumers and other businesses. The 
Internet makes it possible to conduct business throughout the world 
entirely from a desktop. With this global revolution looming on the 
horizon, the development of the law concerning the permissible scope of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 190. Id. at 431; see also Illinois v. Hemi Grp., LLC, 622 F.3d 754, 759 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(“[W]e think that the traditional due process inquiry described earlier is not so difficult to 
apply to cases involving Internet contacts that courts need some sort of easier-to-apply 
categorical test.”).  For instance, the Seventh Circuit has “expressly declined” to make Zippo 
controlling and held that the minimum contacts analysis should be performed “without 
resorting” to Zippo at all.  See Hemi Grp., 622 F.3d at 758–59. 
 191. A. Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction and the Internet: Returning to Traditional 
Principles to Analyze Network–Mediated Contacts, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 71, 86–103 (“The 
difficulty here is that the interactivity of a Web site actually bears no relationship to whether 
the defendant has purposefully availed itself of the forum state, particularly once the 
presumption of aimlessness is discarded. Rather, the conduct relevant to a purposeful 
availment analysis is that which gives rise to the cause of action.”). 
 192. Id. at 109. 
 193. Id. at 112.   
 194. CIVIX–DDI LLC v. Microsoft Corp., No. 99-B-172, 1999 WL 1020248, at *2 (D. 
Colo. Oct. 1, 1999) (“The Internet may represent the latest and greatest challenge to questions 
of personal jurisdiction.”). 
 195. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1123 (W.D. Pa. 1997) 
(internal quotations omitted) (quoting Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616, 
618 (C.D. Cal. 1996)). 
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personal jurisdiction based on Internet use is in its infant stages. 
The cases are scant.196 
The sheer increase in the size, usage, and technological developments that Zippo 
identified cannot be overstated. In 1995, less than 1% of the world’s population had 
internet access; today, approximately 40% of the global population has internet 
access.197 Further, the monopoly of desktop computers has ended, with more people 
accessing the internet on a mobile device than a desktop computer.198 E-commerce 
has grown significantly, with sales reaching $5.076 trillion in 2017.199 Further, 52% 
of all web traffic is now from an automated source, such as scrapers, spammers, and 
bots.200 These changes will become increasingly problematic to the Zippo analysis as 
technology only further develops.  
A. Web 1.0 and Web 2.0 
The era of Zippo is over, as the web has developed from a mostly passive 
experience to one that allows content creation by the ordinary user and increased 
connections between users, platforms, and experiences. The evolution of the web has 
been marked with increased user interactivity and, even more concerning, a move 
towards background processes that create interactivity and user-provider 
relationships with relatively little action on the part of the user. The evolution of the 
internet from the earliest days of Web 1.0, to the burgeoning of Web 3.0, and 
eventually Web 4.0, shows how blurred the lines of interactivity have and will 
become.  
A brief history of the internet may be helpful. The modern internet is an outgrowth 
of the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET), which was 
ultimately a series of computers networked together that could communicate in the 
event of a nuclear attack.201 The only groups with access to this early internet were 
                                                                                                                 
 
 196. Id. at 1123–24 (citation omitted). The cases are certainly not scant anymore—Zippo 
has been cited 1298 times. Forty-seven of those cites have been federal circuit court opinions.   
 197. Wesley Steverson, Appreciating the Growth of the Internet, UWG ONLINE (July 23, 
2014), https://wp.westga.edu/uwgonline/2014/07/23/appreciating-the-growth-of-the-internet 
[https://perma.cc/9LHP-2VZW]; The Rather Petite Internet of 1995, PINGDOM: TECH 
MUSINGS (Mar. 31, 2011, 2:33 PM), https://royal.pingdom.com/2011/03/31/internet-1995 
[https://perma.cc/T3GE-2XTH] (“[In 2011] there [were] almost 2 billion Internet users 
worldwide. In 2000, there were 361 million worldwide. But go back even farther in time and 
you’ll find out that back in 1995, the Internet had a worldwide user base of less than 40 
million.”). 
 198. Stefany Zaroban, U.S. E-commerce Sales Grow 16.0% in 2017, DIGITAL COMMERCE 
360 (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.digitalcommerce360.com/article/us-ecommerce-sales 
[https://perma.cc/UCN7-KA4R]. 
 199. Id.   
 200. Adrienne LaFrance, The Internet Is Mostly Bots, ATLANTIC (Jan. 31, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/01/bots-bots-bots/515043 [https:// 
perma.cc/XV6H-ARMJ]. 
 201. Barry M. Leiner, Vinton G. Cerf, David D. Clark, Robert E. Kahn, Leonard Kleinrock, 
Daniel C. Lynch, Jon Postel, Larry G. Roberts & Stephen Wolff, Brief History of the Internet, 
INTERNET SOCIETY 2–3 n.5 (1997), https://www.internetsociety.org/wp-content/uploads 
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academic and research organizations working with the Department of Defense.202 On 
January 1, 1983, ARPANET converted to a new communications protocol, the 
Transfer Control Protocol/Internetwork Protocol (TCP/IP), that allowed the 
networked computers to communicate via a universal language—this is considered 
the official birth of the internet.203 The Department of Defense ultimately separated 
the military network and assigned a set for public research, the National Science 
Foundation Network (NSFNET). NSFNET grew to link five major national 
computing centers.204 In 1989, the hypertext transfer protocol (http) was developed, 
a technology that allowed computer platforms to access the same web pages. The 
next major development came in 1993, when the Mosaic web browser was able to 
show images, text, and other interface norms on webpages.  
The internet itself is really a massive networking infrastructure that allows 
computers to share information globally. The web, on the other hand, is the term to 
describe how information is accessed over the internet. The first iteration of the 
internet, now called Web 1.0, can be thought of as the “Read Only” web.205 The term 
Web 1.0 was first articulated in 1989, at the time of the rise of the http revolution. 
The webpages present in this generation of the internet were mainly informational 
and allowed businesses or individuals to establish a passive online presence.206 
Scholars describe the main goal of Web 1.0 as to publish and make available 
information to consumers and begin bypassing traditional brick-and-mortar 
operations by introducing the shopping cart and the ability to purchase goods online 
in catalog format.207 To contextualize Web 1.0 in the Zippo framework, most 
websites were passive informational. Some websites were interactive, but only 
because they allowed a customer to purchase from an online store.208  
The Zippo test worked well in the age of Web 1.0, a time in which the internet 
was largely a vehicle to passively receive information (i.e., search for information 
and read it).209 Most of the web was “Read Only,” meaning that users had the ability 
to access webpages for information, but largely could not provide any increased 
interaction.210 The height of interactivity in the Web 1.0 era was the advent of online 
purchasing.211 The Zippo test would classify such purchasing as a highly interactive 
experience; indeed, a number of cases have found personal jurisdiction when 
                                                                                                                 
 
/2017/09/ISOC-History-of-the-Internet_1997.pdf [https://perma.cc/R7CS-BKBA]; A Brief 
History of the Internet, ONLINE LIBRARY LEARNING CENTER, https://www.usg.edu/galileo 
/skills/unit07/internet07_02.phtml [https://perma.cc/T8PE-H8M4]. 
 202. A Brief History of the Internet, supra note 201.  
 203. Id. 
 204. Leiner et al., supra note 201, at 11. 
 205. Manishkumar R. Solanki & Abhijit Dongaonkar, A Journey of Human Comfort: Web 
1.0 to Web 4.0, INT’L J. RES. & SCI. INNOVATION, Sept. 2016, at 75.  
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id.  
 209. See, e.g., Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620 (PKL)(AJP), 1997 WL 97097, 
at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997) (examining a passive website which only provided 
information about the defendant’s services).   
 210. Solanki & Dongaonkar, supra note 205, at 75 (“The main goal of [Web 1.0] websites 
was to publish the information for anyone at any time and establish an online presence.”).   
 211. Id. 
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consumers were able to complete purchases over the internet in the jurisdiction. 
Cases from 1997 to 1999 show that websites that allowed consumers to make 
purchases in the forum, and when consumers did in fact make those purchases, were 
sufficient for a showing of specific personal jurisdiction.212 During the same time 
period, websites that were informational only, or for which no forum resident had 
made a purchase, largely did not confer a basis for specific personal jurisdiction 
under Zippo.213  
The next generation of the internet, Web 2.0, was articulated in 2004 and is 
hallmarked by the move towards social media and user-created content.214 
Specifically, Web 2.0 is the era of user comments, blogs, hosted services, and other 
increased interactivity between users and content creators.215 The names associated 
with Web 2.0 are the major players of social media and mass participation, including 
Facebook, Twitter, Wikipedia, and YouTube. Web 2.0 highlights participatory and 
collaborative exchanges that create a “people-centric” web, a web which the user is 
engaging in a “bi-directional” experience that focuses on user-to-user interactions 
and exchange.216 To say that the backbone of Web 2.0 is increased interactivity is an 
understatement. Virtually all websites in the Web 2.0 era allow user interactivity, 
whether it is the ability to provide comments, “re-tweet” or “share” webpage 
information, or connect with users from across the globe in ways that were not 
possible in the 1990s.217 
Courts have continued to apply the Zippo test in the era of Web 2.0, but with 
significant discrepancy. The main bone of contention appears to be the question of 
whether the interactivity of the website or social media platform is tied to commercial 
activity. This discrepancy is easily seen when posts are made to social media pages, 
such as Facebook, Instagram, or Twitter. In Binion v. O’Neal,218 the plaintiff, who 
suffered from a genetic condition, brought suit for invasion of privacy against 
professional basketball player Shaquille O’Neal after O’Neal utilized a photograph 
of the plaintiff on O’Neal’s Instagram and Twitter account.219 O’Neal had obtained 
the photograph from the plaintiff’s own public Instagram account, an online platform 
that allows social media users to share photos with either the public or a select group 
                                                                                                                 
 
 212. See Stomp, Inc. v. NeatO, LLC, 61 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1078 & n.7 (C.D. Cal. 1999) 
(finding that a website functioned as a “virtual store” where “[c]onsumers [could] view 
descriptions, prices, and pictures of various products [and could] add items to their ‘virtual 
shopping cart’ and ‘check out’ by providing credit card and shipping information”); 
Millennium Enters. v. Millennium Music, L.P., 33 F. Supp. 2d 907, 920–21 (D. Or. 1999); 
Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 56–58 (D.D.C. 1998); Park Inns Int’l, Inc. v. Pac. 
Plaza Hotels, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 762, 764–66 (D. Ariz. 1998).   
 213. See supra Section II.B. 
 214. “Web 2.0 is also called the wisdom Web, people-centric Web, participative Web, and 
read-write Web.”  Solanki & Dongaonkar, supra note 205, at 75. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Nupur Choudhury, World Wide Web and Its Journey from Web 1.0 to Web 4.0, 5 INT’L 
J. COMPUTER SCI. & INFO. TECH. 8096, 8097 (2014). 
 217. Id.  
 218. 95 F. Supp. 3d 1055 (E.D. Mich. 2015). 
 219. Id. at 1058.  
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of friends.220 At the time of the suit, the plaintiff was a Michigan resident, and O’Neal 
was a resident of Florida and Massachusetts.221  
After O’Neal contested personal jurisdiction, the court followed circuit precedent, 
stating that “social media websites ‘do not lend themselves’ to the Zippo test because 
the defendants do not own or operate the websites but are merely a visitor or an 
account holder; in addition, the websites are generally not used primarily to conduct 
business.”222 The court noted that although social media postings were “slightly more 
interactive” because of the ability to make posts, share, or comment (all hallmarks of 
Web 2.0 platforms), the platform lacked a commercial nature.223 Accordingly, 
O’Neal’s posts were little more than the posting of information on social media 
websites, which became accessible to users in Michigan and elsewhere.224 Thus, 
because O’Neal did not own or operate the website, and the postings were not 
intended to conduct business, personal jurisdiction based on Zippo would be 
inappropriate.225 
Similar results have been reached in other cases. These cases examine Web 2.0 
platforms such as Facebook and determine that under the Zippo sliding scale test, 
such websites are largely passive.226 The reasoning in these cases is based on the fact 
that a user who posts information to Facebook is only sharing information and that 
such interactions are only “minimally interactive.”227 These courts are not impressed 
by bidirectional features, such as the ability to “like” or comment on a post.228 
Instead, courts largely focus on the fact that social media sites, such as Facebook, 
YouTube, and Twitter, are not owned or operated by the posters and that these 
websites are not being used to conduct business.229 Particularly noteworthy is the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 220. Id.; see also What Is Instagram?, INSTAGRAM, https://help.instagram.com 
/424737657584573 [https://perma.cc/EM26-R8GP] (On Instagram, users “can upload photos 
or videos to our service and share them with their followers or with a select group of friends.”).   
 221. Binion, 95 F. Supp. 3d at 1058. 
 222. Id. at 1060 (quoting Hyperbaric Options, LLC v. Oxy-Health, LLC, No. 12-12020, 
2013 WL 5449959, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 2013)).   
 223. Id.  (quoting Thomas v. Barrett, No. 1:12-cv-00074, 2012 WL 2952188, at *4 (W.D. 
Mich. July 19, 2012)). 
 224. Id.  
 225. See id.   
 226. See id. 
 227. Id.  (“The websites are not owned or operated by O’Neal, were minimally interactive, 
and the postings were not intended to conduct business.”).   
 228. See Lewis v. Loftin, No. 16-2726-dkv, 2017 WL 5505341, at *6 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 
15, 2017); Thomas, 2012 WL 2952188, at *3 (“The opportunity to comment on, ‘like,’ or 
‘share’ Facebook posts does very little to move Defendants’ page farther up the continuum 
from passive to interactive.”).   
 229. Bell v. Moawad Grp., LLC, No. 1:17-CV-00073-SS, 2017 WL 2704319, *13–14 
(W.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 2017) (“In the relatively new context of social media, courts have applied 
the Zippo test to determine that social media accounts generally do not support personal 
jurisdiction because—unlike the traditional ‘active’ websites—they are not used to transact 
business (e.g., place orders, shipping, etc.) or target a specific forum.”); Sec. Alarm Fin. 
Enters, L.P. v. Nebel, 200 F. Supp. 3d 976, 985 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (applying Zippo test to hold 
that defendant’s “infringe[ment] upon SAFE’s trademarks by continuing to market herself on 
social media, including Faceb ook and Instagram, using SAFE’s trademarks” was insufficient 
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absence of traditional markers of transactional conduct—individuals largely do not 
place orders on social media platforms or exchange payment information.230  
One possible explanation for the failure of some courts to find that Facebook, 
Instagram, or Twitter posts constitute participating in an “interactive” website is the 
rise of an alternative test to assess internet torts. These courts hold that Zippo applies 
when a defendant is operating a website, and an alternative “effects” test, articulated 
by the Supreme Court in Calder v. Jones,231 applies when the defendant has 
disseminated or published information.232 Numerous courts have eschewed the Zippo 
test in favor of the Calder effects test when examining defamatory postings made on 
social media.233 
The Calder test is the product of a 1984 Supreme Court opinion in which Shirley 
Jones, a professional entertainer, claimed that she had been libeled in an article that 
had been written and edited in Florida.234 The article at issue was published in the 
National Enquirer, a magazine published by National Enquirer, Inc., a Florida 
corporation with its principal place of business in Florida.235 Jones brought suit 
against the defendants, the president of National Enquirer, Inc., and a reporter, in 
California, her state of residence.236  
In examining personal jurisdiction over the defendants in California, the Court 
noted that the story published in the National Enquirer concerned activities of a 
California resident in California and that the article was drawn from California 
sources.237 Additionally, the “brunt of the harm” suffered was in California, as 
Jones’s emotional distress and injury to her reputation was suffered in California.238 
Accordingly, personal jurisdiction was appropriate in California based on the effects 
of the Floridian defendants’ conduct in California.239 
                                                                                                                 
 
to support personal jurisdiction); Pathfinder Software, LLC v. Core Cashless, LLC, 127 F. 
Supp. 3d 531, 543 (M.D.N.C. 2015) (determining that the defendant’s Facebook and Twitter 
pages do not support an exercise of personal jurisdiction in North Carolina); Hyperbaric 
Options, LLC v. Oxy-Health, LLC, No. 12-12020, 2013 WL 5449959, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 
30, 2013); JibJab Media Inc. v. White Castle Mgmt., No. CV12-04178 MMM (JEMx), 2013 
WL 12123696, at *5 (C.D. Cal. May 14, 2013) (noting the “interactivity of White Castle’s 
Facebook and Twitter pages is, moreover, insufficient in and of itself to support a finding of 
purposeful direction”).  
 230. Bell, 2017 WL 2704319, at *4. 
 231. 465 U.S. 783 (1984). 
 232. See Cadle Co. v. Schlichtmann, 123 F. App’x 675, 677–79 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting to 
determine specific personal jurisdiction, Zippo applies when a defendant operates a website 
and Calder applies when a defendant has published or disseminated information); Lifestyle 
Lift Holding Co. v. Prendiville, 768 F. Supp. 2d 929, 934–35 (E.D. Mich. 2011) (examining 
difference between Zippo and Calder tests). 
 233. See Schlichtmann, 123 F. App’x at 677−79; Lifestyle Lift Holding, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 
934−35. 
 234. Calder, 465 U.S. at 785. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id.  
 238. Id. at 789. 
 239. See id. at 789−91.  
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In applying the Calder effects test in internet cases, courts examine the effects 
that the online conduct had in the forum state.240 Under Calder, “personal 
jurisdiction exists where an individual purposefully directs activities toward the 
forum state with the intent to cause harm there.”241 Some courts have held that the 
effects test is more appropriate in cases involving defamatory statements that have 
been posted by a user on social media.242 For example, in Steele v. Burek,243 the court 
rejected the use of the Zippo test in a case involving allegedly defamatory social 
media posts on Facebook and online efforts to seed negative online reviews of the 
plaintiff’s book.244 The defendants, in posting on Facebook and organizing online 
groups on Facebook, did not maintain a website, “interactive or otherwise,” such that 
Zippo should be applied.245 The court instead applied the Calder effects test and 
determined that the effects of the defendants’ action were primarily felt outside the 
forum.246  
The distinction between Zippo and Calder in the internet space is thin and does 
not comport with current practice. To courts that draw a distinction, the Zippo sliding 
scale test applies when a defendant actually operates a website.247 This suggests that 
the defendant has to actually “own” or “host” the website in order for Zippo to apply. 
In contrast, other online activity that is conducted on websites not actually hosted by 
the defendant, such as social media sites, donation sites, or online bulletin boards, is 
subject to Calder because the defendant is only publishing or disseminating 
information.248 This is a distinction that no longer has a difference. Traditional 
                                                                                                                 
 
 240. See id. at 789, 791 (uttering defendants’ actions were “expressly aimed” at the forum 
state and were “calculated to cause injury to the respondent” in the forum state); see also 
Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 470 (5th Cir. 2002) (stating at one end of the sliding scale are 
cases where internet site owners “engage in repeated online contacts with forum residents over 
the internet,” which may be sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction); Hawbecker v. Hall, 
88 F. Supp. 3d 723, 729 (W.D. Tex. 2015) (looking at Facebook pages and messages and 
determining “Hall expressly aimed online contacts to Texas residents and intended the focal 
point and brunt of her posts and interactions to be felt by Hawbecker in Texas”); McVea v. 
Crisp, No. SA-07-CA-353-XR, 2007 WL 4205648 at *2 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 5, 2007) (finding a 
defendant’s allegedly defamatory comments on a website invoked the court’s jurisdiction 
when the defendant expressly aimed his comments at Texas, as he knew the comments about 
the research and work of two individuals would inflict the brunt of their harm in Texas). 
 241. Scotts Co. v. Aventis S.A., 145 F. App’x 109, 113 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 242. See, e.g., Farquharson v. Metz, No. 13-10200GAO, 2013 WL 3968018, at *2 (D. 
Mass. July 30, 2013) (applying Calder effects test to case involving allegedly defamatory 
statements posted on Facebook). 
 243. No. 14-11969, 2014 WL 6612386 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 20, 2014). 
 244. Id. at *8−9. 
 245. Id. at *9. 
 246. In cases discussing the issue of personal jurisdiction in relation to internet activity, 
the Sixth Circuit has developed two distinct tests. The Zippo sliding scale analysis applies 
when a defendant operates a website, while Calder applies when a defendant has only 
published or disseminated information. Cadle Co. v. Schlichtmann, 123 F. App’x 675, 677–
79 (6th Cir. 2005); Sanders v. Sennholz, No. 17-10578, 2017 WL 3215207, at *4 (E.D. Mich. 
July 28, 2017). 
 247. See Schlichtmann, 123 F. App’x at 677–79. 
 248. Sanders, 2017 WL 3215207, at *4. (“The only website that Defendants are alleged to 
2019] #PERSONALJURISDICTION  133 
 
notions about web activity are fading—the web is becoming more interactive than 
ever before. First, standard storefront sites, those that mirror a defendant’s traditional 
brick-and-mortar operations, now have a number of social media features on them, 
including the ability to “like,” “comment,” or “tweet” content. Thus, sites are 
purposefully integrating non-hosted features into their sites to meet the expectations 
of site visitors.  
Further, businesses are also using social media to drive product recognition, 
increase traffic to their websites, and even sell products or run promotions. The idea 
that Facebook or Instagram should be subject to a different test for minimum contacts 
because the defendant does not “own” Facebook or Instagram is outdated. These are 
platforms available for public use, which content creators are using to meet their own 
commercial, or noncommercial, needs.  
Zippo is also a poor fit in Web 2.0 social media because social media websites 
provide an entirely different type of “interactive” experience than what was 
envisioned in 1997 when Zippo was decided. In Kindig It Design, Inc. v. Creative 
Controls, Inc.,249 the court noted that 
[W]ith the invention of social media, many individuals, to say nothing of 
organizations, maintain an interactive website. In a matter of minutes, an 
individual can create a Facebook account and upload content to his or 
her own “Facebook page.” That page may allow all other Facebook users 
to interact with it. It is difficult to envision a website that is more 
interactive than the average Facebook page. Indeed, a principal purpose 
of social media is to facilitate interactions between users.250  
Other courts have picked up on the changed meaning of interactivity in the new 
frontier of the internet. In Revell v. Lidov,251 the Fifth Circuit examined a personal 
jurisdiction case in which an online bulletin board (another feature of the Web 2.0 
increased user experience) was determined to be an interactive website when it was 
operated by the Columbia University School of Journalism and allowed users to post 
their own works and read works posted by others.252 The defendant posted an 
allegedly defamatory article to the bulletin board and was sued by the plaintiff in 
Texas.253 The Fifth Circuit noted that because individuals could send information to 
the bulletin board to be posted and participate in an open forum, the site was 
interactive.254  
                                                                                                                 
 
operate is Revote2017, and therefore this is the only website that will be analyzed under 
the Zippo analysis, and the activity on social media networks and GoFundMe, which must be 
analyzed under the Calder effects test.”).   
 249. 157 F. Supp. 3d 1167 (D. Utah 2016). 
 250. Id. at 1174–75. 
 251. 317 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 252. Id. at 472. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. (relying on the fact that “individuals send information to be posted, 
and receive information that others have posted”) (emphasis in original).  The court contrasted 
the situation at hand to a situation in which a website only provided email address and other 
contact information. Id. (citing Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 336–37 (5th Cir. 
1999)). 
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A similar result was reached with respect to Facebook in Hawbecker, which found 
that postings on Facebook by the defendants made the contacts with the forum 
“interactive in nature.”255 These findings are likely based on the premise that users 
of Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram use the pages to share, like, and create 
comments on commercial or noncommercial materials posted by defendants, thus 
heightening interactivity.256  
 An additional consideration in conducting an interactivity analysis is that the 
number of background processes, such as bots and cookies, mean that any website 
can be actively interfacing with the user while that user views what might be 
categorized as a passive website.257 Bots and cookies provide behind the scenes 
processes that make the internet experience even more interactive and connected.258 
Bots are software that perform automated tasks via the internet, and they can be 
set for a wide variety of purposes—both good and bad.259 Bad bots can be used to 
launch Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, extract user data, send spam 
messages, and install hacking tools.260 Good, or more productive, bots can be those 
                                                                                                                 
 
 255. Hawbecker v. Hall, 88 F. Supp. 3d 723, 729 (W.D. Tex. 2015); see also First Aid 
Cellular LLC v. We Fix It Cellular Repair, No. 8:14CV253, 2014 WL 5590815, at *4 (D. Neb. 
Nov. 3, 2014) (“[T]he uncontroverted evidence shows We Fix It’s website and Facebook page 
are at least slightly interactive.”).   
 256. Kindig It Design, Inc. v. Creative Controls, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 3d 1167, 1174–75 (D. 
Utah 2016) (recognizing increased changes in the internet and website operation).   
 257. See id.; see also LaFrance, supra note 200 (“Most website visitors aren’t humans, but 
are instead bots—or, programs built to do automated tasks. They are the worker bees of the 
internet, and also the henchmen. Some bots help refresh your Facebook feed or figure out how 
to rank Google search results; other bots impersonate humans and carry out devastating . . . 
attacks.”). 
 258. See Kindig It Design, 157 F. Supp. 3d at 1174–75 (D. Utah 2016) (“Even a website 
that appears ‘passive’ in nature may actually be interacting with the user’s data and custom-
tailoring the content based on the user’s identity, demographics, browsing history, and 
personal preferences.”).   
 259. Igal Zeifman, Bot Traffic Report 2016, IMPERVA INCAPSULA (Jan. 24, 2017), 
https://www.incapsula.com/blog/bot-traffic-report-2016.html [https://perma.cc/GB62-E6D6]. 
 260. See Taylor Hatmaker, Special Counsel Robert Mueller Indicts Russian Bot Farm for 
Election Meddling, TECH CRUNCH (Feb. 16, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/02/16 
/mueller-indictment-internet-research-agency-russia [https://perma.cc/W8HB-U3Q4]; Jon 
Swaine, Twitter Admits Far More Russian Bots Posted on Election than It Had Disclosed, 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 19, 2017, 7:46 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/jan 
/19/twitter-admits-far-more-russian-bots-posted-on-election-than-it-had-disclosed [https:// 
perma.cc/X5VQ-GBT3]. One example of a malicious bot that Americans often hear about are 
“Twitter bots” that attempt to impersonate real humans to manipulate Twitter feeds or spread 
fake news. As reported by numerous news outlets, and mentioned in the ongoing special 
counsel investigation, malicious bots were used by Russian government backed “trolls” to 
reach millions of Americans via Twitter and Facebook to spread fake news stories during the 
most recent presidential election.  
 A recent news story estimated that more than 50,000 Twitter accounts were linked to 
Russian bots that were used to amplify false narratives during the presidential election. 
According to congressional testimony from leading social media companies, “Russian bots 
retweeted Donald Trump nearly half a million times in the final weeks of the 2016 campaign, 
and more than 60,000 Americans RSVP’d for Facebook events created by Kremlin-linked 
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that, for example, crawl the internet to enhance Google search results or promote 
sales for goods and services online.261 Good bots perform the tedious and repetitive 
tasks that keep the internet well-organized and responsive.262 They can be generally 
categorized into four groups: (1) “feed fetchers” that carry internet content to other 
mobile and web applications; (2) “search engine bots” that index websites on the 
internet to enhance search results and create page rankings; (3) “commercial 
crawlers” that extract data for digital marketing; and (4) “monitoring bots” that 
monitor website availability and performance.263 
From a personal jurisdiction standpoint, bots are particularly challenging.264 Bots, 
by their very nature, conduct activities on the internet without human intervention. 
They are capable of conducting transactions, placing advertisements, and providing 
information in “chat” format.265 An individual or organization that releases a bot onto 
the internet has not targeted any specific forum and indeed may not even know in 
which fora its bot is operating.266 It is difficult to use traditional notions of personal 
jurisdiction, such as purposeful direction or Zippo’s interactivity test, in such 
situations.  
Interactivity in the era of Web 2.0 is also complicated by the use of cookies on 
most websites. Cookies are data that is sent from a website’s host server and then 
stored on the user’s computer.267 This stored data then communicates with the server 
to share information about user preferences, registration information, and site access 
                                                                                                                 
 
trolls . . . .”  Jason Silverstein, Russian Bots Retweeted Trump 500,000 Times at End of 2016 
Campaign, Created Fake Facebook Events Seen by Thousands, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 31, 2017, 
8:49 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/russian-bots-facebook-twitter-trump-2016-campaign 
-793122 [https://perma.cc/8GHB-LD34]. Even now, Russian bots continue to spread fake 
news in the wake of various major news stories. See Erin Griffith, Pro-Gun Russian Bots 
Flood Twitter After Parkland Shooting, WIRED (Feb. 15, 2018, 2:00 PM), https://www 
.wired.com/story/pro-gun-russian-bots-flood-twitter-after-parkland-shooting [https://perma 
.cc/AX8E-B24Y]; Aarti Shahani, Russian Bots Are Spreading False Information After the 
Florida Shooting, NPR (Feb. 20, 2018, 4:38 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/02/20 
/587375771/russian-bots-are-spreading-false-information-after-the-florida-shooting [https:// 
perma.cc/4Q8Z-AGGM].  
 261. See Zeifman, supra note 259.  
 262. See id. 
 263. Id. For a detailed listing of some of the most active bots on the internet, see Dan 
Breslaw & Igal Zeifman, A Closer Look at the Most Active Good Bots, IMPERVA INCAPSULA 
(Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.incapsula.com/blog/most-active-good-bots.html [https:// 
perma.cc/MUL9-EAYB]. 
 264. See Denis T. Rice, Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: Which Law and Forum Apply to 
Securities Transactions on the Internet?, 21 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 585, 598 (2000). 
 265. See id.  
 266. See id. at 646 (“For a purchaser, seller, or an investor to engage in the use of bots and 
other non-geographically grounded intermediaries is somewhat like sending a note in a bottle out 
to sea: it becomes harder to argue that the note writer’s home jurisdiction should control in 
preference to the residence of whoever picks up the note or the place where it is picked up.”).  
 267. Rick Handel, A Conceptual Analysis of Nexus in State and Local Taxation, 67 TAX L. 
623, 707 n.536 (2014); HTTP Cookies, MICROSOFT (May 30, 2018), https://docs.microsoft 
.com/en-us/windows/desktop/wininet/http-cookies [https://perma.cc/UU6V-PWTV]. 
136 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 94:103 
 
that helps advertisers control the type of content a user is seeing online through 
advertisements and banners.268  
When a cookie is stored on a user’s computer, the information gathered by the 
cookie is stored as a name-value pair.269 Most sites will store at least a user ID on a 
user’s machine (i.e., a unique ID assigned by the site to that particular user).270 
 Other sites may store more information, such as an ID for each time the user 
returns to the website or the time each viewing session started.271 A website can then 
retrieve this information from the cookie file, although it cannot access any other 
information from the user’s computer.272 The website host will then use that 
information to do a number of activities, including determining how many people 
are visiting its site, allowing customization so that a site looks different to each 
visitor, or calling up items the user has added to an online shopping cart.273 
The widespread use of cookies should make even the most passive website under 
the Zippo test active. The district court in Blumenthal recognized that the “constant 
exchange of information and direct communication . . . with [the] host’s computer . 
. . is the epitome of website interactivity.”274 Cookies provide that very epitome of 
exchange, as well as a level of customization that might look like targeting the forum. 
For example, cookies allow websites to display the weather in the user’s local 
jurisdiction, welcome returning users back to a site, and customize other viewing 
options, such as layout and color. These exchanges can create a personal viewing 
experience for the user that is specifically targeted to that user (in their own forum). 
Such an experience eviscerates traditional conceptions of site passivity that were 
articulated in Zippo.  
B. Web 3.0 and Web 4.0 
The reality is that the internet is no longer the same animal that it was when Zippo 
was decided in 1997. Despite this transformation, the personal jurisdiction landscape 
has remained relatively unchanged, and the problem of basing internet jurisdiction 
on “interactivity” is coming into sharper focus. Websites themselves are now more 
pervasive, with over 330.6 million domain names existing in 2017.275 Further, even 
basic websites support features such as sharing content, contacting company 
representatives, sending messages, receiving notifications, or posting comments.276 
                                                                                                                 
 
 268. HTTP Cookies, supra note 267. 
 269. Id. 
 270. Marshall Brain, How Internet Cookies Work, HOWSTUFFWORKS (Apr. 26, 2000), 
https://computer.howstuffworks.com/cookie1.htm [https://perma.cc/D4YN-98PX]. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id.  
 274. Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 56 (D.D.C. 1998). 
 275. Internet Grows to 330.6 Million Domain Name Registrations in the First Quarter of 
2017, BUSINESSWIRE (July 18, 2017, 4:39 PM), https://www.businesswire.com/news 
/home/20170718006399/en/Internet-Grows-330.6-Million-Domain-Registrations-Quarter 
[https://perma.cc/KS83-D2ZQ]. 
 276. See Kindig It Design, Inc. v. Creative Controls, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 3d 1167, 1174–75 
(D. Utah 2016) (noting that the “level of interactivity on even the most basic Facebook page 
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The development of Web 2.0, 3.0, and maybe even 4.0, make the landscape 
constantly shifting and difficult to pin down.  
Beyond Web 2.0, it seems even more clear that an analysis of interactivity will 
continue to degrade. In 2006, John Markoff of the New York Times first articulated 
that a new generation of the internet was imminent—Web 3.0. While Web 2.0 was 
focused on social networking, collaboration, and sharing, Web 3.0 will focus on 
back-end improvements to make the internet more singular and connected.277 
In the personal jurisdiction space, certain Web 3.0 developments will prove 
particularly challenging. The goal of Web 3.0 applications is immersion with an 
ecosystem that understands itself and is able to freely correct and publish information 
through the use of artificial intelligence.278 Additionally, users will be able to publish 
their own content and services by interacting with applications built by companies 
and other users.279 Interesting here is the idea that the web may transition into various 
virtual worlds with 3D portals and avatar representation.280  
Two things will likely characterize the transition to Web 3.0: semantic markup 
and web service.281 First, semantic markup will provide context and intelligence to 
human-machine interactions.282 The term “semantic markup” refers to the 
communication gap that currently exists between users and web applications.283 At 
this time, web applications are unable to understand the content of human language 
or searches and thus are limited in determining what is relevant to a user and what is 
not.284 Developments in semantic markup should be such that they will allow 
applications to assign context, and additional relevance, to data.285 
Additionally, web service will be preeminent in the age of Web 3.0.286 Web 
service software systems will support “computer-to-computer interaction over the 
internet.”287 This direct communication of application to application will allow 
broader searches for information, and, when combined with semantic markup, allow 
                                                                                                                 
 
arguably exceeds that of even the most interactive website in 1997 when Zippo was decided”).   
 277. Umesha Naik & D. Shivalingaiah, Comparative Study of Web 1.0, Web 2.0 and Web 
3.0 (March 2009) (unpublished conference paper), https://www.researchgate.net 
/publication/264845599_Comparative_Study_of_Web_10_Web_20_and_Web_30 [https:// 
perma.cc/T3P3-Z7FL]. 
 278. See id. 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id.   
 281. Web 1.0 vs Web 2.0 vs Web 3.0 vs Web 4.0 vs Web 5.0 – A Bird’s Eye on the Evolution 
and Definition, FLAT WORLD BUS., https://flatworldbusiness.wordpress.com/flat-education 
/previously/web-1-0-vs-web-2-0-vs-web-3-0-a-bird-eye-on-the-definition [https://perma.cc 
/TZ9Z-RHEZ]. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id.  
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. For example, “if someone is searching for the flight timings of a particular country, 
a semantic search will return flight times to this country as well as the details of the weather 
conditions at the time of visit, maps, city guides, and the other useful information such as 
hotel, restaurant and car reservations.” Solanki & Dongaonkar, supra note 205, at 76.  
 286. See Web 1.0 vs Web 2.0 vs Web 3.0 vs Web 4.0 vs Web 5.0, supra note 281. 
 287. Id. 
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for more contextual and personalized searching of the internet.288 This increased 
personalization and customization will prove challenging because all users 
interacting with a website may be personally targeted in their unique jurisdiction.  
Beyond Web 3.0, the concept of a Web 4.0 is being explored. Web 4.0 would 
comprise of a truly semantic web in which human-machine interactions would be in 
symbiosis.289 The technology of Web 4.0 would represent artificial intelligence 
equivalent to a human brain.290 All interactions on the web between users and 
computing technologies would be highly intelligent and would include better natural 
language processing.291 A key part of Web 4.0 is a movement that is already being 
experienced at early levels through the transition of operating systems to the cloud 
and data accessibility across multiple platforms.292  
The challenges of personal jurisdiction for Web 3.0, and certainly Web 4.0, are 
apparent. First, the move to a semantic web will blur the line between content 
creators and content viewers. Web 3.0 will be “executable,” and data will be 
displayed in an extremely customized and personalized way.293 Such technologies 
will wholly eliminate the concept of interactivity that was expressed in Zippo. Zippo 
relied on the technological model of Web 1.0, where content providers set up 
informational websites, advertisements, or the virtual equivalent of brick-and-mortar 
stores. In contrast, a move to the semantic web will increase the use of artificial 
intelligences to share, customize, and allow users to interact with data. If Zippo is 
failing in the Web 2.0 era, it certainly cannot survive a transition to Web 3.0.  
IV. A MOVE AWAY FROM PREDICTABILITY: EMBRACING THE INTERNET’S REALITY  
A number of scholars have already proposed various approaches to the “Zippo 
problem.”294 These proposals range from abandonment to modification, and all have 
their merits. However, with the advanced stage of Web 2.0, and a likely move to 
Web 3.0 in the coming years, it seems time to yet again suggest a new method of 
handling cases that involve the intersection of personal jurisdiction and the internet.  
While Zippo has had problems with new technologies, changing landscapes, and 
inconsistent applications, the heart of its difficulties are more fundamental. 
Specifically, from International Shoe, to Burger King and Asahi, and to Goodyear 
and Daimler, the theme has been to “give[] a degree of predictability to the legal 
system that allows potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some 
minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to 
suit.”295 Courts have modeled this predictability concern within the liberty interests 
of the Due Process Clause in order to prevent a defendant from “being subject to the 
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binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no ‘meaningful contacts, 
ties, or relations.’”296 
The concept of predictability has given rise to the “purposeful availment” or 
“purposeful direction” components of the minimum contacts analysis. Courts 
examine whether the defendant engaged in conduct in the forum that created contacts 
that were not random or fortuitous, such that the defendant could reasonably 
anticipate being hauled into the forum to defend a lawsuit. These considerations are, 
of course, strictly based on the defendant’s conduct and the defendant’s ability to see 
what consequences his actions may have in the forum. 
To more accurately represent modern technologies of the Web 2.0 age, a change 
is needed in the personal jurisdiction analysis. Specifically, this change should be 
flexible enough to embrace the fact that the internet is now almost entirely interactive 
and that placing websites into discrete categories is no longer representative of the 
type of common technology that people and business are using. 
First, there should be a decreased emphasis on any remaining aspects of territorial 
sovereignty. Territorial sovereignty was poor fit leading up to International Shoe in 
1945, and it remains an outdated concept now. The reality is that technology is more 
connective than ever. With the advent of bots, online marketing, and online 
purchasing, businesses no longer confine themselves to doing business in a certain 
state, or even country. Web 3.0 and Web 4.0 technologies are likely to make the web 
even more globally connected. Indeed, Web 3.0 or 4.0 technologies could remove 
ownership over content entirely and instead create a singular, holistic worldwide 
platform.297  
Second, in lieu of the Zippo test, courts should assess internet websites and 
activities in relationship to personal jurisdiction by examining whether there was a 
“directed online” connection to the forum and the matter in dispute. This real 
connection is a lessened showing than what is currently required by the purposeful 
availment or purposeful direction analysis conducted by lower courts. The reason for 
this change is simple—the type of purposeful availment analyses currently utilized 
by courts applying Zippo, or traditional notions of personal jurisdiction, try too hard 
to translate concepts over the internet into physical equivalents, which is not always 
possible.  
The purposeful availment problem can be easily seen in the context of bots or 
artificial intelligence technologies. As noted above, bots are applications that run 
automatic tasks on the internet. These applications have the ability to interact in an 
increasingly complex number of ways with humans. For example, chat bots are 
programmed to understand natural human language and to provide appropriate 
responses and solutions while mimicking natural human conversation.298 Chat bots 
can be targeted to a variety of use cases including customer support, online sales, 
technical support, and virtual assistants.299  
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These bots are often integrated into various online messenger platforms including 
Facebook Messenger, which has over 100,000 bots operating on the platform.300 
Facebook users can ask weather bots for a local weather report, use travel bots to 
recommend flights, ask news bots for the latest headlines, and make purchases with 
sales bots or ask product questions.301 
Many companies have found great success using chat bots to increase customer 
engagement, drive sales leads, and develop market trend research.302 “Research from 
Forrester showed 5% of companies worldwide said they were using chatbots 
regularly in 2016; 20% were piloting them; and 32% were planning to use or test 
them in 2017.”303 
Social media data, browser cookies, purchase history, and data collected by a 
variety of other sources, including bots, are used by advertisers to deliver targeted 
advertising to consumers online. Marketers have used the massive amount of 
consumer data available online to create highly targeted advertising that appears to 
consumers when they visit a site. Facebook touts its ability to precisely target 
audiences that are relevant to the advertising.304  
 The Zippo test is obsolete in the context of these modern iterations of the 
internet—determining interactivity by a bare transmission of computer files from a 
defendant’s hosted website does not recognize that websites (and thus people) now 
communicate through social media, chatbots, targeted advertisements based on 
cookies, and location-based web targeting. Further, in 2019, individuals now 
understand that their online activities are public, available across the globe, and can 
be shared, retweeted, or posted onto other platforms by bots or other internet users. 
Finally, commercial activity is no longer a gold standard. Online content can be 
published to websites hosted by companies, or it can be published to third-party 
social media platforms. The distinction is irrelevant, as in both instances the content 
creator is targeting a national audience.  
Thus, this Article proposes that the only requirement of a “directed online 
connection” is that the defendant has conducted internet activity that could reach the 
forum under operating procedures established by the defendant. Essentially, internet-
based activities that do not limit the geographic scope should serve as sole notice that 
the defendant could be hauled into a distant forum arising out of activities in the 
forum. In an age of increased global communication, maintaining ties to traditional 
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exercises of personal jurisdiction seems unwise. Businesses and individuals have the 
power to structure their behavior to avoid internet activities or to utilize forum 
selection clauses on transactions over the internet.305  
Other nations’ courts have already realized the importance of flexibility in 
approaches to personal jurisdiction with the changes modern technology has brought 
to the internet. For example, the Canadian Supreme Court in Hunt v. T&N recognized 
a need for “greater comity in our modern era when international transactions involve 
a constant flow of products, wealth and people across the globe.”306 That court 
cautioned against any “mechanical” counting of contacts in lieu of a more reasoned 
approach that in some cases might be geography neutral.307 An example of this 
approach can be seen in Alteen v. Informix Corp.,308 in which an American company 
was sued in Newfoundland.309 Canadian plaintiffs had purchased shares of the 
American defendant over the internet.310 Plaintiffs later sued, claiming that the 
defendant had issued false and misleading statements in press releases concerning its 
product and its earnings expectations for the first quarter of 1997.311 The defendant 
contested jurisdiction, arguing that it had never issued any public statements to the 
Canadian press, it did not solicit the plaintiffs’ investment, and never made 
statements or communicated with the plaintiffs.312 
The Newfoundland Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s argument, stating that 
when defendants communicated their financial performance “through internationally 
accessible mediums,” they had sufficient notice that there could be legal action 
against them in Newfoundland.313 The court specifically pointed to the accessibility 
of the defendants’ financial information over the internet.314 
Other Canadian cases have taken similar views on the internet—essentially, 
conduct on the internet provides sufficient notice that a defendant could be called to 
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litigate in a distant forum.315 To Americans this idea might seem shocking, but the 
reality is that defendants are reaping tremendous benefits from global internet 
technology and a global market, and thus must bear some of the risk. In the next 
decade, online sales could reach one-third or more of all consumer expenditures with 
e-commerce sales growing at an annual rate of seventeen percent.316 Further, it is not 
just large businesses that are benefitting from the internet through traditional online 
stores. Small and large businesses alike now use Web 2.0 platforms like Facebook, 
Twitter, and YouTube to reach large audiences and drive traffic for their brands.317 
A distinction between hosting and posting for websites seems particularly tortured 
against this backdrop.  
In addition to assessing a real connection, courts should still take into the account 
the fairness factors that have been long identified as critical to the personal 
jurisdiction analysis. Specifically, courts should consider “the burden on the 
defendant,” “the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute,” “the plaintiff’s 
interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief,” “the interstate judicial system’s 
interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies,” and the “shared 
interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.”318 
The purpose of these fairness factors is simple—if the “directed online” test allows 
a heightened level of minimum contacts in internet contacts, then the fairness factors 
have an increased role in ensuring the requirements of due process. 
In applying the fairness factors to cases involving internet contacts, a few 
important considerations should be noted. First, the convenience of the plaintiff 
should be fully considered. In internet cases, the plaintiff has the internet to access 
products, services, or other activities in the comfort of their own forum. For an 
individual plaintiff, this convenience is the product of a defendant that is taking 
advantage of technology to boost sales, exposure, and contact. It is the defendant that 
has reached out through what it knows to be a globally accessible technology, and it 
is the defendant who may choose to stop doing so if it does not want to take on the 
risk of litigation or to customize its online operations to avoid the target forum. 
Further, convenience to the defendant should serve as a check against possible 
jurisdictional abuse.  
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In sum, the approach outlined above seeks to avoid arbitrary distinctions drawn 
based on web activities. An example of the efficacy of this approach can be seen by 
looking to recent cases that are forced to consider the intersection of website activity 
and social media. For example, in Nutramarks, Inc. v. Life Basics, LLC, the defendant 
operated a website in which it marketed iced tea beverages.319 A consumer or retailer 
could not directly purchase the iced tea beverages online, making the site a “middle 
ground” under the Zippo test.320 In addition, the defendant operated a Facebook 
account, YouTube account, Instagram account, and Twitter page to drive business to 
its website and crowdfunding page.321 
In examining whether the defendant could be subject to jurisdiction in Utah, the 
court rejected jurisdiction on grounds that third parties hosted the additional web 
activity and users from Utah could interact across all platforms.322 This reasoning is 
arbitrary. The defendant, a company, was taking full advantage of multiple online 
platforms that were accessible in Utah. Indeed, Utah was specifically listed in the 
dropdown list on the crowdfunding website.323 Even though no Utah residents had in 
fact contributed, this does not mean that the defendant failed to have minimum 
contacts with Utah. The defendant took advantage of several nationally accessible 
web platforms to drive business, marketing, and interest. To say that it did not make 
minimum contacts is outdated.324 The defendant’s choice to use interactive and 
nationally accessible platforms should serve as a real connection to the Utah forum. 
CONCLUSION  
The post-Zippo world is a new frontier. The internet remains one of the fastest 
growing parts of modern life, with more than four billion people now using the 
internet worldwide.325 While assessing the interactivity of websites may have worked 
well during Web 1.0 (or the “Read Only” web), Web 2.0, 3.0, and 4.0 promise 
increased interactivity, increased customization, and more blurred lines with regards 
to minimum contacts.  
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The major problems with Zippo continue to be inconsistent applications of its 
interactivity test as well as confusion regarding how, exactly, social media should 
play into the interactivity equation. These issues will only become more prominent 
in coming years. 
To resolve this challenge, a bright-line rule can be utilized. Instead of a tortured 
interpretation of purposeful availment, minimum contacts through website activity 
should be achieved when a defendant utilizes the internet knowing that the 
information could reach the forum state. The remaining aspects of the specific 
jurisdiction analysis—the requirement that the contact give rise to the claim and the 
application of reasonableness factors—remain untouched and provide a sufficient 
check on excessive exercises of jurisdiction. Such an approach should provide 
clarity, and certainty, as web platforms continue to develop.  
 
